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Abstract 
This research is based on work in the TSER-project ". Urban Redevelopment and Social 
Polarisation in the City.U.R.S.P.Le. (Moulart, Swyngedouw and Rodriguez (1999) 
The report summarises the objectives of the Danish Urban Development Programme (UDP) 
the Oerestad project in Copenhagen , its institutional form and the conflicts in the phases of 
design and implementation which arose around the neo-elitist type of governance embodied in 
the UDP. The urban governance changes are interpreted in a broader historical context with 
emphasis on how the transition towards a new post-industrial economy and urban form was 
mediated via political and institutional struggles over the form and content of urban planning 
in Copenhagen. The UDP is analysed as an outcome of a transformed Copenhagen urban 
regime and a changed powermatrix, which from the late eighties opened for a new state led 
and growth focussed entrepreneurial urban and Metropolitan regional policy. Finally the 
challenges and dilemmas for overcoming the dualism of present urban governance between 
neo-corporate growth regimes and participatory and welfare oriented policy paradigms is 
elaborated upon. 
The Danish urban development project the Orestadsproject embodies larger transistions of 
Urban planning and governance in Copenhagen. Up till the seventies urban policy was 
characterised by top-down rational planning. The postwar "golden age of the Welfare City" 
rested on a strong centralised City Hall administration in the hands of a powerfull Social 
Democratic leadership since the beginning of the 19th Century. During the seventies the 
efficiency and legitimacy ofthe regime was challended by (i) a weaked urban economy due to 
industrial decline and demographic changes, which eroded the tax-base and (ii) powerfull 
leftist forces and succesfull mobilisation from new urban movements. The latter challenged 
the top-down style of planning and style of governance and mobilised for community based 
participatory urban regeneration. In the beginning of the eighties a situation of political and 
institutional dislocation of the regime fused with a financial crisis of the City. This in tum 
increased the conflicts over additional grants with the state level (from 1982- 92 in the hands 
of a Liberal- Conservative coalition) in the mid and late eighties. From the late eighties an 
onwards state initiated pressure for strategic growth policy became manifest and a gradual 
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shift towards an "Entrepreneurial City" strategy linked to a croos-border regional strategy 
became the new orientation of urban policy during the nineties. The Danish UDP was the 
result the formation of a strategic "growth partnership" between the state and the Capital. In 
this strategy the Orestadsproject is the flagshipproject of the Oresunds region. 
At the start of the millenium the urban policy orientation and governance can be characterised 
by the duality between 
I. Participative. empowering welfare oriented strategies, which targets deprived districts and 
neighbourhoods, which are based on notions of the diverse and solidaristic City and 
2. Neoelitist/corporative market driven strategic growth strategies, which are based on 
notions of the Entrepreneurial City. 
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I Welfare Regimes, UDPs and Dynamics of Social Polarisation 
The relationship between Urban Development Programmes (UDPs) and dynamics of social 
exclusion and polarisation cannot be analysed without taking the nature and efficiency of the 
general welfare regime into account. 
The poss ible negative impact of UDPs in terms of increasing social polarisation in part 
depends on the efficiency of integration and redistribution policies and regulations. The 
quality of the welfare regime is decisive for "harm reduction" e.g. the quality of social 
protection schemes, level of income compensation in case of unemployment and not least the 
type of housing policy. The welfare regime also influences the access of different social 
categories to the new opportunity structures that UDPs are supposed to create. 
With regard to job possibilities it is, for example, not enough to analyse the changes in the 
demand for different categories of labour (high, medium and low skilled etc), that the UDP 
eventually might generate. The strength of unions on the labour market is also crucial. New 
jobs in the service sector can for example take the form of low paid "dead end jobs" or 
unionised jobs for decent pay. 
The capacity and orientation of labour market policy also effects access to new opportunity 
structures. A crucial aspect is the extent to which education and labour market programmes 
reach and are available to the lower skilled members of the workforce. Labour market 
programmes can be inclusive or elitist with regard to upgrading of qualifications for those in 
the "marginalised zone" at greatest risk for labour market exclusion. Other parts of the 
regulatory framework e.g. housing policy are also important for changes in stratification and 
opportunity structures. 
In other words, the same type of UDP strategy can have different impact on social 
polarisation and living conditions depending on the type of welfare regime and the broader 
regulatory framework in which it is implemented. Esping-Andersens (1990) well known 
welfare regime typology suggests three worlds of Welfare Capitalism or regimes: 
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I) The Universalist social democratic regime, where social citizenship is institutionalised 
2) The Continental Bismarcian with emphasis on compulsory social insurance schemes 
3) The liberal, Anglo-Saxon residual/marginalist welfare state. 
In the universalist/redistributive welfare regimes the relation between social class or market/ 
position and living conditions is modified - or as Esping Andersen conceptualises it - to some 
extent decommodified. The impacts of socio-economic change, e.g. UDPs on labour and 
housing markets are, therefore, modified or "filtered" by the operation of the welfare regime 
(Goul-Andersen 1999). 
In residual welfare regimes, where the "welfare state filter" or buffer between market position 
and living conditions by definition is weak, the impact of UDPs on living conditions will be 
more direct. 
In much of the debate about the welfare state the Social Democratic and social liberal forces 
argue that a strong universal welfare state is functional w.r.t. the stimulation of economic 
growth precisely because it "socialises" the social costs of socio-economic (including spatial) 
change. The welfare state makes long-term "sustainable growth" possible because it creates a 
regulatory framework which tames the socio-economic polarisation effects of market forces. 
It does so via (i) "politics of social citizenship against the market" and (ii) to a large extent 
supports the dynamics of market forces by ensuring and legitimising the externalisation of 
social costs due to socio-economic changes and thereby reduces resistance at the firm and 
local level. The prototype of this "market taming and supporting" logic is the Danish system 
for unemployment insurance for Danish wage-earners: the term of notice at the plant level is 
very short, but the level of unemployment benefits are relatively high. The negotiated balance 
between "taming and stimulation" of the market dynamics is the content in the concept of the 
Danish "negotiated economy" (Pedersen & Nielsen, 1989). 
The Danish welfare model after the golden age 
Like in most EU member states the battle for full employment - one important cornerstone in 
the Scandinavian package - was lost in the late seventies. On the intellectual and political 
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scene the welfare state project became a much more defensive project. The advantages of the 
developed welfare state: social rights which to some degree emancipated the individual from 
the forces of the market was translated into "disincentives" and "market imbalances" by the 
offensive neo-liberal and neo-conservative forces. However, in a comparative perspective the 
Danish case is an example of a relative stable regime. But as we will discuss, major changes 
have taken place. 
Unlike many other countries the labour market is still regulated by strong trade unions. The 
problem of the "working poor" and unregulated illegal work is relative marginal, since most 
sections of the labour market are unionised and minimum wages has been kept on a -
relatively speaking - high level. During the eighties there was a modest reduction in the levels 
of social protection schemes for unemployed (Andersen & Larsen, 1994). In 1982 a 
Conservative-Liberal government came into power after decades of Social Democratic rule, 
but the changes were moderate and the overall welfare regime was still closest to the 
universalist or Scandinavian type (Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
Welfare regimes and housing regulations. 
One very often overlooked part in most comparative welfare reg1ll1e research is housing 
policy. Figure I on the top of the next page combines two criteria: state versus market 
regulation and housing as public-versus private good. The vertical axe is state versus market 
regulation of the housing sector. The horizontal axe is the extent to which Housing is regarded 
as part of social citizenship - as a common good (supported via market subsidies and/or 
Public Housing schemes) or is seen as a private good, which only in a residual way should be 
the object of public regulation. 
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Figu re 1: Housing comparative criteria 
Housing as a public good Housing as a private good 
• public production support of housing for all • production of housing for the weaker groups in 
society • securing good housing facilities e.g. through 
favourable loaning condition • limited public securing of housing faci lities, - no 
or only limited control with the market for 
loaning 
• consumption support - tax-subsidies 
Public control with the housing sector 
• large share of social housing sector in relation to 
the overall housing marked 
• protection of tenants through regulation 
• consumption support for all 
Source: Munk, 1998. 
• no or only limited consumption support 
Marked control 
• low share of social housing sector in relation to 
the overall hous ing marked 
• low level of protection of tenants 
• need-based support 
Major changes in the housing market the last decades have been a reduction in the share of 
private rental app. from approximately 435.000 to 290.000 from 1970 - 1990. This is mainly 
due to changes in national regulations where individual private ownership and private 
corporate housing has been encouraged. Since the late seventies is has been stated by law that 
if private owners of rental blocks want to sell, they have first to offer the tenants the 
possibility of collectively buying the apartment blocks. Many former tenants have therefore 
formed Corporative Housing. The access to Corporative Housing has reduced some of the 
worst speculations in the housing market. However, over a longer period the price level of 
Corporative Housing tends be equalised with private ownership apartments. 
Segregation, housing and urban policy in Copenhagen 
In the City of Copenhagen the promotion of Social Housing and Municipal owned Housing 
was from the beginning of the century an important part of Social Democratic Housing 
Policy. Social Housing in Denmark dates back to the beginning of the century where the first 
Social Democratic controlled Municipalities supported and encouraged Housing 
Cooperatives, which became closely linked to the labour movement (Kolstrup , 1996). The 
residents have from the beginning run the housing cooperatives and sti ll to day their 
democratic structure is regarded as one of the strengths in the Danish "housing regime". Up to 
the seventies the Social Housing Movement and the national regulations of Social Housing 
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was regarded as an important element in the welfare regime (Lind og Moeller, 1994). This 
changed gradually and in the eighties the amounts of new build Social Housing decreased. 
Further more, the combination of inflation and regulation of tax reduction for private 
ownership from the sixties and onwards made the purchase of property very advantageous 
(Lind and Moeller, 1994). The result of these changes was that in particular in the eighties 
middle-income residents left the Social Housing sector in which the share of low-income 
residents increased. 
In Copenhagen the housing policy gradually changed during the eighties and nineties so that 
the share of Social Housing and Municipal owned Housing of the total Housing Market has 
decreased. 
The structural problems of Copenhagen since the late seventies are illustrated in the list of 
socio-economic indicators in table I. The problems has to do with a weaker tax base, and 
greater expenses due to a combination of a greater share of unemployed, unski lled and social 
assistance receivers, etc. (refer also to Appendix 2) 
Table 1: Chosen "Segregation Indicators" in the Copenhagen Region, 1993 
Geo-admini- Work force Whi te-collar Blue-collar Unemployed Ayerage Families on 
strative in pel. of in pet. of in pet. of in pet. of gross-income social 
unit population work force workforce employed 15-66 years assistance 
(CPH~1 00) in pet. of 
I DODulation 
CODenhagen 53 57 18 14 100 12 
Frederiksberrr 56 66 II 12 127 8 
Copenhagen 57 61 14 9 136 7 
County 
Fred.borg 58 58 14 8 138 7 
County 
Roskilde 61 57 15 8 132 7 
County 
Greater 56 59 15 10 125 9 
Copenhagen 
Region 
Denmark 56 44 22 12 108 6 
Source: The Copenhagen Stallstleal Yearbook, 1995, yanous tables and Anders Munk, 1998 
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Changes in the urban hierachy 
Some districts have gradually been gentrificated like the Inner City and Christianshavn (this 
district is also well known for Christiania). In the gentrified districts private ownership and 
private Cooperative Housing has increased in the last decades and is now dominating. Other 
districts with a great share of Social Housing like Bispebjerg and Kongens Enghave have 
moved from the middle to the bottom of the urban hierarchy. Thirty years ago these districts 
with a big share of Social Housing built in the twenties, thirties and forties was the prototype 
of well organised working class quarters. Thirty years ago Noerrebro and Vesterbro, with an 
older housing stock from the late IS.th century and a big share of private rental blocks, was 
dominated by the "lower" working class. To day the oldest classical working class districts 
N oerrebro and Vesterbro has moved towards a more mixed ethnic, social and income profile -
due to huge urban renewal schemes in the late seventies and eighties and a growth in private 
ownership and Co-opt housing ( refer to appendix 2) 
Long-term effects of labour market exclusion 
As mentioned earlier the battle for full employment was lost in the late seventies. Not only 
did the general level of unemployment increase to a 10-12 pct level in the beginning of the 
eighties, but also long-term unemployment increased dramatically. The socio-spatial 
landscape gradually changed during the eighties: The growing segment of long-term labour 
market exclusion was increasingly concentrated in distinct urban districts. 
So despite a - comparatively speaking - relative high quality level of social protection signs 
of new poverty or social exclusion could be observed - not least due to the long-term effects 
oflabour market exclusion. Over a longer period of times the general protection schemes and, 
in broader sense, the ability to ensure inclusion was not sufficient. (Andersen and Larsen, 
1993). 
Gender and Social Exclusion. 
Since 1993-94 the growth in employment in Denmark has reduced the unemployment figures 
to a 5-7% level. The composition of long-term labour market exclusion has shifted so that 
long term unemployment today is much more clearly concentrated among middle aged and 
13 
elderly unskilled women and men. In particular, the latter social category - elderly unskilled 
men seems to represent a new distinctive type of social exclusion (Andersen and Larsen, 
1998), which policy makers and welfare institutions have not been able to respond to. 
Whereas the risk for economic impowerishment (in terms of lack of economic 
resources/financial poverty women are still sligtly overrepresented compared to men.) and 
long-term unemployment is more or less the same for men and women the risk for "hard core 
social exclusion" in terms of alcoholism, break down of every day life routines e.t.c. is much 
greater for men. 
One of several reasons for the changed gender profile of social exclusion have to do with the 
(overloked) fact that the most innovative politics of social integration were developed for and 
largely by women. Where a range of experimental social action programmes targetted 
marginalized women (Andersen and Larsen, 1998) for example the successful daytime high 
schools have been successful with regard to social integration at , the innovations with regard 
to socially excluded men have been more or less absent. 
An important section of the labour market excluded in the late nineties have been unemployed 
for a very long time and often regarded as unemployable. However, due to the strategic shift 
in unemployment policy towards obligations on the unemployed to participate in educational 
or "workfare" activation programmes (Torfing, 1998), the problem of "employability" for the 
most marginalised segment has become a hot political issue. Critics argued that the workfare 
programmes in some cases become authoritarian and punitive vis-a-vis the group of most 
marginalised, e.g. elderly unskilled men with no realistic chances on the ordinary labour 
market. This has caused an intense debate about the inadequacy of the "workfare"/labour 
market reintegration orientation as the only way to ensure some sort of social and economic 
integration. 
Despite a strong economy, growth in employment and increased resources to adult education 
programmes, the long term effects of mass employment are still present. Some of the 
unskilled elderly unemployed did not get a real chance for reintegration into the transformed 
postfordist labour market. Even general employment growth and stronger emphasis on active 
labour market policy has - so far - not been fully able to prevent exclusion in what is often 
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labelled the increasing "knowledge race". Not all groups can benefit from the increased public 
investment in human capital enlargement and (re-) education. 
Workfare and Activation Programmes 
The first and dominant change in the Danish welfare regime in the nineties is a growmg 
emphasis on activation or workfare programmes. In the political discourse and rhetoric it is 
described as a shift from notion of passive rights to a notions of active inclusion - a type of 
Durkheimian rhetoric (Andersen, 1998)1. 
The content of the activation policy is a compromIse between neo-conservative and neo-
liberal forces and the Social Democrats. The total benefits for individuals participating in 
activation programmes are at the same level as unemployment benefits or social assistance, 
but the hourly pay is close to the Danish minimum wage (approximately 10 ECD per hour). 
Therefore the participants in the activation programmes usually participate less than full time 
(37 hours per week) in order not to reach the maximum level for benefits. Thus one can 
discuss the extent to which the term workfare with its American/British connotations is useful 
for describing Danish unemployment policy. In fact, it has both similarities: the obligation for 
unemployed to participate in the programmes if benefits are to be maintained - and 
distinctions: The Danish activation policy was not implemented in a context of deregulation 
and absence of minimum wages. The positive part of the activation programme is that 
Municipalities have the obligation to offer job training. 
Since the late eighties the obligation on the local authorities to offer job training and 
activation schemes has gradually been extended from the very young (18-19 years) to include 
all registered unemployed entitled to unemployment insurance or social assistance. If the 
1 This is more or less similar to the shift in dominant social theory from focus on class and equality discourse to 
exclusion-integration discourse. Theoretically, the notion of social exclusion points to a shift in the 
conceptualization of poverty from extreme class inequality and lack of resources (Andersen and Larsen, 1998) to 
a broader insider/outsider problemotique; that is, a change of focus in the poverty and inequality discourse from 
a vertical to a horizontal perspective. This shift in focus can also, to some extent, be described as a shift from a 
Marxist and Weberian tradition of class and status analysis to a Durkheimian anomie/integration discourse 
(Andersen, 1999). However, the contemporary order of stratification of post-industrial societies is not only one 
of horizontal stratification, inside or outside the labour market or mainstream society, but also one of vertical 
stratification. Vertical stratification arises from differences in access to and command over economic, cultural, 
social and symbolic capital. As Levitas (1996) notes, the exclusion/integration discourse can obscure the fact that 
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unemployed is not willing to participate in the schemes they will not receive benefits. The 
quality in tenns of improving skills and job possibilities of the schemes are very different 
from municipality to municipality. Evaluations show that particularly for elderly unskilled 
men and sections of the immigrant populations (which despite improved employment 
possibilities still face discrimination) the schemes have little positive effect. One of the 
reasons why the politics of activation are quite traditional compared to some other EU-
member states is that traditions for social enterprises and social cooperatives are almost absent 
in Denmark (Bengtson, 1998). The often overlooked "conservative" side" of the Danish 
Welfare model is that it is based on a social compromise, which means that the political 
system must keep its "hands off" the sphere of production (Kolstrup, 1996). Unlike France 
and other EU member states the role of social enterprises and social cooperatives is very 
marginal because Danish municipalities are not allowed hy law to invest in the production of 
goods which can be sold on the market and thereby (in theory) crowd out private business. 
Local Workfare Schemes as Mechanism of Municipal Exclusion 
One aspect connected to the activation policy is of particular interest from the URSPIC 
perspective. For the most marginalisedldiscriminated groups and districts, a new problem has 
grown out of the implementation of the activation schemes. Some municipalities have 
adopted a very strict and punitive authoritarian practice of the activation policies for social 
assistance receivers, whereas others have adopted more participate and empowering 
approaches, e.g. by linking the activation programmes to ecological projects, cultural work 
and local welfare services. 
This is possible because national legislation is vague in defining clients/unemployed rights 
vis-it-vis the municipalities. The result is that some of the clients who for one reason or 
another are dissatisfied with the activation programs, move away from the these 
municipalities. Hence the concept of "activation refugees" has surfaced in the discourse. It is 
claimed that a group of "social assistance nomads" or "workfare free-riders" move to the 
municipalities or the districts which practice a "softer" less authoritarian activation policy 
(Interview with Editor of the District newspaper in Kgs. Enghave). 
the positions people are "integrated" in through paid work are often fundamentally unequal. Therefore the notion 
of social exclusion should always be linked to a notion of social polarisation. 
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This above mentioned phenomena has its clear social geography. The most deprived districts 
in Copenhagen, who have less resources to develop activation projects and practice a "softer" 
implementation of the schemes, have according to some social workers become increasingly 
"the victims" of a more authoritarian activation policy in other districts and Municipalities. 
Thus the workfare programmes can be used as discrete but efficient tools to push the socially 
excluded over the district/municipal borders . 
Rhetoric about social responsibility for companies 
The second new orientation in the Danish Welfare Model has a more discursive and rhetorical 
rather than of a practical character. A number of efforts to mobilise the social partners in the 
fight against social exclusion have arisen. The Ministry for Social Affairs has launched a 
National Committee under the label "New Partnership for Social Cohesion". Since the return 
of the Social Democrats to government in 1992, the rhetoric of partnership and social 
responsibility of social partners has increased and experimental pilot prograrnmes have been 
set up in an effort to support the active role of companies in the fight against social exclusion. 
The trade unions and employers have, not least after pressure from the government, 
negotiated what is termed "social chapters" in the collective bargaining. The social chapters 
are supposed to be a tool to stimulate job creation for disabled and others with lower than 
average productivity. 
The effOli to mobilise the social responsibility of the social partners is heavily inspired by the 
rhetoric of the EU-institutions, the Third European Action Program against Poverty (Poverty 
1989-94, Andersen, 1994), the Social Dialogue, the European Business Network for Social 
Cohesion EBNSC, (initiated by former EU Commissioner Jacque Delors) etc. Here again we 
find a neo-communitarian, neo- Durkheimian type rhetoric stressing the challenge to all 
subsystems, including the labour market, to allow flexible participation for the less 
"productive" citizens etc. 
It is still an open question whether this trend will be more than rhetoric or if it will gradually 
become part of a more offensive political struggle for a revitalised welfare society project. 
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Experimental Social Action 
Until recently (1993) urban policy has not been defined as a distinct policy-field. The 
historical reasons for this will be analysed closer in the next section, where we focus on 
planning and urban policy as part of the evolution of the Danish welfare regime. The third 
new trend in the last decade is the growing role of experimental Social Renewal and social 
action Programmes (Hegland, 1995), which emphasise experimental and multidimensional 
action against social exclusion. In particular, the creation of the first multidimensional Urban 
Social Action Programme in 1993/94, was a manifestation of attempts to stimulate bottom-up 
empowerment orientation in deprived urban areas. (Vestergaard, 1998). 
The Urban action programme was inspired by Poverty 3 and multidimensional urban policies 
in other EU-member states (Brennum, 1994). It was the first time, in Denmark, that a large-
scale urban programme based on principles of area-based action and local participation was 
launched. The programme is at present the most innovative and experimental part of public 
planning and welfare policy. It has elements of a "politics of positive selectivism" and "social 
mobilisation" approach. In the implementation of these programmes the National Urban 
Committee in the negotiations about project contracts with the Municipalities and Housing 
Associations has insisted that the ideas about citizen participation and empowerment 
orientation in the projects should be taken seriously. 
In Copenhagen, the Kongens Enghave (which is situated beside Oerestaden) and Bispebjerg 
districts were chosen as Model Action districts and right now concrete plans of action are 
being implemented. It is interesting to note that in many cases the demands and strategies 
which arise from these community/district programmes foster new political pressures on the 
City Council for additional resources and services to the deprived districts (Interview with the 
Editor of the District Newspaper SydVest Folkeblad). 
The new urban policy has introduced rhetoric of experimentation, participation and 
partnership with parallels to the campaign for the socially responsible firms. In a recently 
launched national plan of action about "The City of the Future", (Danish Ministry for Urban 
Affairs , 1999). Concepts like the "Inclusive City", the "Learning City, the "Democratic City" 
and the "Green City", which relate to the Agenda 21 movement have been introduced. 
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The "City of the Future" document underlines that social, cultural and economic problems of 
deprived districts should be addressed in a multidimensional and coherent manner in order to 
avoid the "Succession Cycle" (Skifter-Andersen, 1995). It is explicitly acknowledged that 
long lasting multidimensional programmes vis-a-vis the deprived areas are necessary due to a 
lack of coherent planning in the past and the long-term impact of socio-spatial concentration 
of unemployment and social exclusion. Partnerships with the local companies are suggested 
as tools to improve co-operation with public employment agencies and the companies. In 
practice the latter effort has only played a marginal role in the implementation of the 
programmes. 
The most radical and concrete part of the action plan suggested in the "City of the Future 
document" is a section about how to hinder social segregation. Here it is stated that the 
separation of privately owned houses, associate housing and social housing in separate zones 
of the city should be avoided by proactive planning in the future. The planned mix of different 
types of housing and hence different income groups should be a guiding principle for Future 
City zoning. This orientation has already caused criticism from neo-liberal and conservative 
forces since it is in contradiction to market driven development on the real estate market2• 
The perhaps most controversial issue in contemporary housing policy have been centred 
around regulations of the share of ethnic minorities in Social Housing Blocks. In some 
municipalities with a large share of ethnic minorities it has been suggested that a maximum 
limit for the share of ethnic minorities should be legal. Others have argued that a large share 
of minorities not in it self constitutes deprived areas. Some Social Housing Associations and 
Municipalities have lobbied for legal access to regulate moving in so that "resource strong 
groups" are favoured. 
The Social Housing Association also constantly argues that the Social Housing sector should 
not be the only part of the Housing market, with social responsibility obligations. The Social 
2 Another interesting discussion is about new developing "mixed ownership" : e.g. that residents in Social 
Housing Associations could be credited for individual investments in their apartment. The idea about mixed 
ownership is meant as a tool improve incentives for the more affluent residents to stay in Social Hosing 
Association in stead of moving to the private ownership. 
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Hosing Associations argue that the responsibility for housing should be more equally shared 
between all parts of the housing market. So far, this demand has been completely refused. 
To day the municipalities can still allocate up to 25% of the apartments in Social Housing 
blocks to social clients, homeless people, refugees etc. In districts like Kgs. Enghave and 
Bispebjerg in Copenhagen with an elderly and cheaper housing stock with dominance of 
Social Housing, the concentration of very vulnerable groups has increased in the last decade. 
In recent political discourse it has been argued that the lack of access to Social Housing and 
rental apartments in the affluent districts is an overlooked part of the mechanisms which over 
time create segregation in the Copenhagen Region. Many planners and politicians (refer also 
to the City of The Future document mentioned before) argue that new regulations should 
ensure that in every Municipality a share of the total housing stock should be social housing 
in order to avoid increased segregation in the Housing market. 
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II Principles of planning, Urban policy, and UDP's 
As discussed before urban policy has until recently not been a separate policy-field in 
Denmark. In the following section we will discuss urban policy and planning in a broader 
historical and political administrative context, i.e. as a part of the Danish welfare regime and 
the specific policy tools implemented in promoting urban development. In other words: to 
analyse present days policy tools, the particular shape of the Danish UDP and the dynamics of 
inclusion/exclusion we need to illuminate the Danish planning system in general and its 
historical dynamics. 
In the 1960's, the need for administrative reforms became obvious, and a larger piece of work 
was commenced to reorganise the entire public sector. The overall motive was the need for 
governing an expanding economy in particular directions, as well as the problems with in-
built expanding mechanisms within the public sector were realised. The 1970's were truly 
reform years in Denmark and the most extensive reform was that of the municipalities that 
was launched in 1970. 
Municipal Reform 
The municipal reform was not one single reform but rather a complex of reforms, 
implemented step by step through the 1970's. Besides the municipal reform, several sector 
reforms dramatically changed the whole political and administrative set up in Denmark (e.g. 
Andersen, Mikkelsen & Steenstrup 1980; Ingvartsen 1991; Ingvartsen & Mikkelsen 1991). 
The single most important part of the municipal reform in 1970 was a profound reorganisation 
of local government in Denmark. The main occasion for starting this reform was the 
complicated administrative division between counties (amter), county-boroughs (kebstreder) 
and rural districts (sogne (parishes)). This administrative setting was considered insufficient 
and a more uniform and uncomplicated system was needed. A further problem was that in 
several cases naturally demarcated localities had grown into one physical area, but still 
remained divided by administrative borders. This fact presented inconvenient administrative 
problems and one principle therefore became One town - One municipality. A third objective 
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was that bigger units were needed as an administrative precondition to delegate response and 
authority to the regional and local levels of decision-making. 
The refonn meant that the special administrative status (county-borough status) of the old 
provincial towns was abolished. Instead, a two-tier local political-administrative system was 
implemented, counties and municipalities gained a more unifonn and strengthened system of 
legal administration (Ingvartsen 1991:76ff). The refonn caused a reduction in the total 
number of municipalities from 1100 to 275, and the number of counties was reduced from 25 
to 14. 
A very important part of the municipal refom1 was realised by the need for a fundamental 
renewal of the financial tools. During the fifties and sixties, the financial management of the 
welfare state had grown into a very complicated system of transfers and regulations between 
the different administrative levels (Mikkelsen 1991). This was a reimbursement system that 
had developed since the beginning of the century and especiaIIy after the first social welfare 
reforms back in the 1930's. In this system each municipality was entitled to have a pre-given 
percentage of its expenses within each assignment refunded from the state. Besides being a 
very complicated system to administer the more principal problem was that one public 
authority could make expansive decisions, while the expenses could be sent to another. The 
financial system also had to be less bureaucratic and greater harmony between economic 
responsibility and decision-making was needed. The system of reimbursement has therefore 
gradually been replaced by a system of general grants based on objective criteria (Bogason 
1995: 101). The system of general grants rests on the idea that expansive requirements and 
economic capacity (defined as the tax base) are differentiated by structural factors and 
equalisation in the perfonnance of the welfare principles is needed. This is one reason why 
the state is still responsible for many of the financial implications of the welfare state, and this 
is why a national system of financial redistribution between municipalities was implemented. 
As soon as the new county and municipal borders were implemented a process of 
decentralisation began that totaIIy changed the division of duties between the administrative 
levels. The principles of this decentralisation process were that executive functions should be 
administered as close to the citizens as possible (i.e. on the municipal level) and the 
management of a case should not be placed at another administrative body at the same time. 
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On this basis the new counties took over full response of duties that needed a greater amount 
of people, most importantly hospitals and secondary schools, but also some social services 
and social security functions. They also acquired planning and supervisory functions in 
respect to e.g. city planning. First of all, public schools were considered as the important task 
of the municipalities. In fact, the drawing of the new county boundaries was dependent on the 
population basis for maintaining one central hospital, and the minimum of a municipality was 
considered to be about 4,000 inhabitants so that a primary school system could be maintained. 
The examples show that the municipal refoffil was about creating sustainable and neutral 
entities in the management of the welfare state (Schou 1994). This principle affects the 
division of labour between counties and municipalities. Counties provide services and 
functions that under normal circumstances can not be provided for by the municipalities. 
Among the responsibilities of the counties are hospitals, major roads, the planning of land use 
and environmental protection and e.g. some cultural services. Municipalities are responsible 
for the delivery of services with a direct contact with citizens. It includes a wave of services 
such as kindergartens, libraries, town planning and regulation, social services and leisure-time 
activities, and as already mentioned, primary schools. 
During the 1970's the counties and in particular the municipalities took over many functions 
from the state. At the same time many new duties were initiated because of the changes in me 
social system. In the 1960's the housewives joined the labour market in great numbers, and 
the municipalities had to take over many of the functions that previously were considered 
family matters. Day-care and care of elderly citizens nearly exploded through the 1970's. 
Besides this, the growing unemployment rate from me mid-seventies placed a hard burden on 
the municipal level to manage rehabilitation and social security. These duties were imposed 
on the municipalities by the sector reforms such as the social refoffil and the new Social 
Security Act. With the primary assignment in the municipalities, a system of sector planning 
was built up regarding health, education and social security, integrated into central objectives 
via orders, instructions and regulations. 
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Physical Planning 
Besides the very ambitious sector planning systems a comprehensive system of physical 
planning was created, mostly concerning the use of areas. Physical planning goes back to 
1938 when the Act on Town Planning (Byplanloven) was implemented. This act imposed 
detailed area planning on municipalities with more than 1000 inhabitants (roads, installations 
and estates). In 1949 the Act concerning Urban Development (Byudviklings10ven) was 
implemented with the intention of creating planning tools to regulate urban growth and make 
common planning across municipalities possible. 
The very detailed (and hence demanding) area planning in the Town Planning Act was soon 
replaced by master plans that plotted a course for future area plans based on expected 
developments in the population and industry. Urban growth was administered by particular 
appointed planning committees with the primary assignment to parcel out the particular zones 
for city growth based on the master plan. The minister of the environment appointed 
professionals, municipal members and one state official (prefect) in the committees that 
administered the Act on Urban Development. These different forms of regulatory frameworks 
or planning-tools were to be approved by the minister of the environment. Besides this the 
ministry had supervisory and controlling functions as well as the minister had the right to 
impose on the municipalities detailed planning within specific areas. 
These acts concerning town planning and urban development, as well as related acts and 
adjustments during the 1950's and 1960's, should be seen as reactions against and adaptations 
to the problems of urban growth. As a consequence the system became more and more 
complicated. One example is that the original four regulative areas that the Urban 
Development Act should regulate (Copenhagen, Arhus, Alborg and Odense) were extended to 
more than 40 areas around the country in 1970 (Bundesen, Kruse & Rasmussen 1991:82). 
With the marked changes in the rural and urban landscapes the need for substantial reforms of 
the physical planning systems became obvious, and also in this respect the municipal reform 
was a necessary precondition. From the late 1960's a sophisticated physical planning system 
was constructed in three important steps. In 1969 the city and land zone act (by- og 
landzoneloven) and the Nature Conservancy Act (Naturfredningsloven) were implemented. 
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More importantly, the law on national and regional planning passed in 1973, and the law on 
Municipal planning passed in 1975 (implemented January first 1977). Together they 
constitute the regulatory framework on physical planning in Denmark. 
The main considerations in the plan reform followed the basic ideas in the restructuring of the 
public sector: simplification, modernisation, decentralisation and publicity. But national 
planning and national planning tools should counterbalance the power that was delegated to 
the primary levels. The City and Land Zone act was an attempt not only to simplify the Act 
on Urban Development, which it replaced. It also intended to ensure an appropriate 
countrywide use of land with respect to the environment, the landscape and summer 
residences by stating the superior principles of physical planning in Denmark. Physical 
planning became a three-level planning system: national, regional and local. The principles of 
the system are laid down in the Planning Act, most recently updated in 1992. The logic of the 
system is that national planning overrules regional planning, and regional planning overrules 
local planning. 
On the other hand the planning system stresses the importance of the participation local level . 
The Planning Act is a framework law so that the superior and general framework is made at 
the national level, though national interests in some cases can be promoted via directives. 
Regional planning still needs to be adopted by the ministry, while the Municipal Act 
transferred the competence to make resolutions on municipal plans from the minister of 
environment to the municipality councils. Local plans within the municipality can be 
implemented without the confirmation from higher administrative levels. 
A principal gain of the planning reform was the openness that it provided in matters regarding 
the single citizen. It demanded that citizens should have the ability to be directly involved in 
the planning process. Therefore, each planning process includes public period(s) where the 
public can give objections and ideas for the further development of the plan. The 
municipalities were even enjoined to stimulate the public debate on the objectives and 
contents of the plan, and in some cases alternative means are included in the planning. And 
council minorities even gained their rights to have alternative opinions included in the 
publication (Lemberg 1981 :70). 
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More important is the administrative procedure of the system in that the municipalities first of 
all make their proposal for the use of land within their area, perhaps in co-operation with other 
municipalities. And the intention is also that the municipal plan includes superior 
considerations on land use within the county as well. The uniqueness of this procedure is that 
the considerations at the municipal levels are made prior to the planning of land use on the 
county level. And the considerations on county level are done prior to the planning at national 
level. This open planning principle did not change the formal decision making chains and 
procedures, but as a principal, it provided better opportunities for public objections, protesting 
and for alternative ideas to grow within the physical planning process. Planning was no longer 
seen as the objective and rational weighing of different means and ends but recognised as a 
strong political field. For the same reasons planning competence was moved from pure 
administrative bodies to political agencies with the principal thought as to remove the 
hierarchical top-down process (Gaardmand 1978:32). 
From Management of Growth to the Management of Crisis 
During the 1970's the planning system was organised to manage economic growth. Even 
though the international crisis hit Denmark profoundly in 1973, it was only considered as a 
matter of fluctuations of the market (e.g. Hansen, 1987). First in the end of the 1970's the 
structural dimensions of the crisis was realised, and at the same time the critique of a growing 
but ineffective welfare system widened. Government shifted from improvement or "the 
management of growth" to "the management of crisis", and this meant even stronger 
emphasis on economic planning. From the mid-seventies new planning tools within both 
sector planning and physical planning were subjugated to economic planning as the kernel in 
state governance (Hansen 1988: 140ft). 
In the fall 1982 Social Democrats handed over power to the conservative/liberal government. 
The leading message from the new government became the need for adapting and reducing 
the public sector. The new government clearly stated that the main problem in society was not 
the growing unemployment rate, but the deficit on the balance of payment and the public 
budget. This most clearly indicates the shift in economic policy away from the Keynesian 
orientation. This, off course, also involved changes in the view on the role of the public sector 
and planning. 
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To reduce the public sector, privatisation was launched as the mam idea of the new 
conservative/liberal government, and they immediately appointed a privatisation committee. 
After a short period in power, the focus shifted from the privatisation rhetoric to "market-
governance", "freedom of choice" and "new financial mechanisms" as means to change the 
public sector services from supply side to demand side, and hence from politically regulated 
to user-regulated mechanisms. These catchwords were the most far-reaching elements in the 
"Modernisation-program" that the government launched in 1983. The intention of the 
programme was to effectively stop public expansion, but still maintain and improve public 
service (Bentzon 1988:26). The other, and non-conflictive elements in the programme were: 
decentralisation of competencies and responsibility, better service and practices within the 
public sector, better public personnel ( especially leadership), and extended use of new 
technology (Bentzon 1988:26ff, Bogason 1988:213f). This programme, more than any other 
became the manifest for a more neo-liberal orientation in Danish politics during the 1980's. 
Back in I 980, the social democratic government had replaced the long-term sector planning 
instruments with "adjustment and theme-planning" to the advantage of more flexible and 
experimental forms of organisation. In general, the new government followed the lines that 
the former government had pegged out (Schou 1988). Attempts were made to cut out the 
formal procedures of citizen-participation and other so called bureaucratising mechanisms 
from the planning procedures, but only slight changes occurred in the sector system during 
the period. 
The program for modernising the public sector was primarily oriented against the state sector, 
but its general ambitions influenced the public sector as a whole, and off course also the state 
- municipality relationship. The municipalities manage such at great part of the public sector, 
that their involvement in the modernisation process was a simple prerequisite to reduce public 
expenses. In practice, the government made frequent interventions in the local economy, e.g. 
by reducing the general grants and introducing punishment mechanisms against municipalities 
that did not manage to keep their spending. The interferences became more selective and 
directly oriented against the single municipality with a shorter - or none - planning horizon 
(Schou 1988:345f). The new practice of state-interference did create a far more tensed 
relationship between the administrative levels than before (e.g. Nielsen 1985). 
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The most interesting renewal of the planning system in the 1980's is probably the "free-
municipality" initiative. This initiative was not directly a part of the modernisation 
programme, but it can be seen as a practical solution to the demand for new steering-
mechanisms that the government so profoundly had argued for in the programme. The free-
municipality initiative was first of all an attempt to further decentralise political competence 
to the local levels of decision-making, to adapt local governance to its own surroundings, 
hence in the last end to get a better utilisation of resources. Another idea of the experiment is 
that initiatives have to grow "from below", and that a freedom in fonns of organisation would 
promote the need for more flexible and adaptable solutions ofthe public service. 
From 1985 the free-municipality initiative was started as an experiment, and also in this 
respect a far more direct relationship between the single municipality and the Home Office 
was created. And also this disregarded the direct influence of the interest organisations on 
public management, and fitted well with the political ambitions of the government. The role 
of the central state was to approve each initiative made at the local level, so that they did not 
conflict with general law and order, and welfare and health objectives. It was also a clear 
ambition, that expansive decision-making was not tolerated, but had to match with the general 
level of expenses. 
Ejersbo and Klausen (1997) argue that the free-municipality experiment was the promoter of a 
very intense process of a structural reorganisation within the municipalities from the late 
1980's and during the 1990's. Changes have occurred in the structures of the council-
committees and administration, but first and most profoundly in a process of decentralisation 
within the municipalities themselves, i.e. from the municipality council to the institutional 
level. Schou (1994) points at four objectives in this process: I) regulation by general financial 
means; 2) user-influence; 3) competition and 4) goal-attainment. It seems to be agreed that 
these changes at the level of local government and welfare institutions indicate tendencies to 
a changed role of the municipalities, as well as in the relationship between the state and the 
municipalities. The state is getting more involved with citizen- and user rights, while the 
municipalities to a greater extent are responsible for the supply of services, via the tools 
mentioned above, but in a magnitude of new organisational fonns (e.g. Ejersbo & Klausen 
1997). 
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In general these changes indicate that the institutional levels has become more independent. 
However it is important to stress that it was only in the "soft" welfare institutions, 
kindergarten, schools etc. that formalised user influence was strengthened. What we have 
witnessed during the 1980's and the 1990's are a combination of continuos strengthening of 
the economic policy tools at the state level and further decentralisation at the level of local 
government. 
An Attempt to Plot the Principles of the Danish Planning System 
As mentioned elsewhere the DanishINordic Welfare State is well known for its strong 
interventionism and at the same time it as an example of promoting social citizenship and 
"balanced" development (Andersen 1990; Baldwin 1990). But what is then the specific profile 
between the welfare state and the Danish planning system? To make our arguments distinct, 
we first need to emphasise a theoretical perspective on the evolution of the Danish Welfare 
state, and then we will specifically relate this to the interaction between the administrative 
levels. 
Schmid (1995) argues that the common element in the evolution of the Welfare State is that it 
institutionalises the responsibility of social reproduction. But the genealogy of this process is 
very different in different countries and regimes. Further, Schmid argues, that the jimdamental 
characteristic of the Scandinavian Model is that it developed "from below", ( unlike countries 
like France with much more autonomous and centralised state apparatus) i.e. from the 
concrete practises and experiences of social movements in particular the labour movement 
with insurance associations and other self-help initiatives. When the labour parties took over 
in national government in the 1930's these associations gradually became integrated within 
the state. This process was first articulated within the Social democratic run municipalities 
from the beginning ofthe century and on wards, and later on it became perceptible in the state 
bureaucracy (Schmid 1995:45). The civic associations captured the state and the local 
governments and linked the welfare state to civil society (Schmid 1995:38). Gradually these 
arrangements from below became more or less fully incorporated and institutionalised in a 
general welfare system. 
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The institutionalisation of the welfare state can be understood in terms of scales such as 
autonomy versus integration and centralisation versus decentralisation. This is especially 
important in the development of the municipalities in the Nordic countries that have evolved 
in a dual role as both being territorial political entities and administrators of state policy (e.g. 
Naustdallid 1993, Kjellberg 1985, Hansen 1997). The distinction between territorial 
autonomy and national integration are usually seen as adequate to understand the opposites in 
the municipal reform (e.g. more or less centralised). But the point to make here is that the 
usefulness of these concepts is not in their constituency as opposites, but as complementary 
and as elements in an ongoing process. Seen as complementary and processual they can be 
used to analyse the very different outcomes that have constituted the modem welfare state and 
the shape of planning. The reform ofthe 1970's is a good illustration of this. 
According to Bogason (1995:95) the municipal reform in the 1970's is the most 
comprehensive political administrative reform since the 1849 constitution. In this constitution, 
a very important principle in the evolution of the Danish welfare system was ratified: the right 
to local self-government. Local autonomy has a long tradition in Danish - and Scandinavian -
history, but indeed so has state steering, and both objectives influenced the making of the 
municipal reform. The ongoing discussion has focussed on which of the principles, the 
autonomous or the integrative, that the municipal reform supported most (e.g. Hansen 1997). 
There seems to be a consensus on the question that local autonomy in Denmark is higher than 
even in the other Scandinavian countries, and that the municipal reform in Denmark was more 
autonomous than its Scandinavian counterparts3 But, as also argued by Hansen (1997) it is 
questionable if the municipal reform favoured the most the autonomous perspective. First of 
all, the reform caused the municipalities to truly become the implementers of the welfare 
society (Hansen 1997:117, Schou 1994, Ingvartsen 1991). As a matter of fact the basic social 
rights are defined very detailed by the state, most specifically within education and social 
security. To guarantee social citizenship, the national system has kept the responsibility for 
the financial implications of a large part of the welfare sectors (e.g. social security, health and 
education) and therefore local expenses are to at large extent nationally regulated and fixed. 
3 While local autonomy seems to be stronger in Denmark than in the other Nordic countries, the political 
influence from e.g. the periphery within the state-apparatus seem to be much stronger in Norway (e.g. Hovgaard 
1997). 
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The ambitious sector planning and physical planning system in the 1970's are excellent 
examples of the overwhelming integrative planning ambitions of the national welfare state. 
On the other hand, the autonomy perspective was certainly not absent in the process that put 
the municipal reform in place. Many geographic and political circumstances and conflicts 
influenced the final structure and outcome of the municipal reform. But the creation and 
implementation of it was to a large extent the result of initiatives from the local level (e.g. 
Ingvartsen & Mikkelsen 1991: 40ft). In fact, many municipalities for many years were used to 
co-operate, e.g. in school affairs. In the late 1940's a voluntary regional planning was 
commenced in the Greater Copenhagen area, and this tradition soon spread over the whole 
country, so in physical planning there was also a year long experience to draw upon. In the 
processes up to the municipal reform many municipalities realised that uniting was a mean to 
maintain an old principle under new circumstances, i.e. local control of its own affairs. 
Typical for the reform was that only in minor cases it was necessary to use legal power to go 
through with the joining-process (Ingvartsen & Mikkelsen 1991: 92). 
What we can state is that the reforms of the 1970 's had national political and social 
integration as their leading motive, but placed the administrative responsibility of the welfare 
state at the local level. As pointed to earlier this in practice meant - and even though it is not 
fully adequate in terms of the realities - that everything that reasonably can be administered 
locally is assigned to the local level. This responsibility in itself gives room for political 
autonomy and manoeuvre at the local level. And this, combined with the fact that 
municipalities in Denmark in principal have there own right to levy taxes, gives local 
decision-making a high degree of autonomy. Compared to other European countries local 
authorities have a considerable freedom to decide what non-mandatory tasks they will 
undertake (e.g. Norton 1983). 
The evolution of a "strong" welfare state and the simultaneous high degree of local 
competence may be considered as an apparent paradox. But as argued by Kolstrup (1996) this 
combination is actually a part of the success, and state interventionism and continuo processes 
of local self-determination do not necessarily work as opposites. The obvious lesson to learn 
from the Danish case is that autonomy and integration can be balanced via politically 
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motivated objectives. In the Danish case they have fitted together through the openness and 
participatory traditions of the institutional system. 
It is clear that while the evolution of the welfare state rested on political ambitions of 
integration, equality and participation, planning was the road to reach these ambitions. The 
integrated national and regional planning system was the road to an economic, cultural and 
social equalisation where the growing level of welfare could be managed for the benefit for all 
the parts of the country (e.g. Ingvartsen 1991:251). The plan-reforms of the 1970's had 
publicity, citizen participation and a "bottom up" planning procedure as leading motives. 
From Politics to Policy 
As already discussed, the process of political/administrative decentralisation has continued 
through the 1980's and 1990's, but with an even stronger accentuation on general economic 
regulations at the national level - in particular limitation on access to increased municipal 
taxation. The neo-liberal wave in the 1980'sdid not in practice mean a fundamental break with 
the strong redistribute welfare model and the principals of the planning system. Actually, only 
minor disagreements were between the dominating political parties on the meaning of the 
public sector in structural change and e.g. privatisation in the more radical sense of the word 
never influenced Danish politics during the 1980's. There was also some consensus on the 
necessity to put the brake on public expenditure growth, and in fact the social democrats had 
begun a partly successful slowing down of municipal expenses via agreements with the 
municipal organisations (Schou 1988:338) 
As already explained "hard-core" liberalism declined very soon in Danish politics, and in the 
late eighties social liberal and centre forces increased their power on national level. New 
policy issues entered the political stage, now centred on Schumpetarian issues (Jessop 1998). 
In the late 1980's the government negotiated labour market policy and entrepreneurial 
programmes with the Social Democratic party, e.g. education and training programs for the 
unemployed. In this new climate, and with the social democrats back in power from 1992, the 
Danish UDP was born, which we will return to. 
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Despite the "consensus-like" politics and the relative stability of the Danish welfare regime, 
i.e. the evolution of the welfare state in general and the planning system in particular, it has 
off course never been a un-conflictive development. Its success must rather be seen in relation 
the institutionalised mechanisms of conflict resolution, including the strong participatory 
element. But off course, things have also changed, and the important question now is, in 
which direction the planning system is heading under new and globalised conditions. 
In his discussion on politics and regional planning, Jorgensen (1997) points at two opposite 
directions or ideas in the academic debate about the Danish planning system. The first idea 
put forward by contemporary political scientists is the thesis of "hyperpolitics", i.e. the 
diffusion and domination of politics in all spheres of public life: society, economy and 
planning is increasingly negotiated political projects that modem politics has embedded, in 
the so-called negotiated economy. In the negotiated economy- and here related to industrial 
and regional policy - the state is taking fonn as: 
"".a complex governance network in which the central authority plays the role of 
strategy maker, co-ordinator, arbitrator and consensus builder. As a consequence, in 
addition to assuming leadership in developing a new programme of structural 
politics". the state is also having to attend to the equally important role of fostering a 
common frame of meaning and action among relevant economic and social 
organizations" (Amin and Thomas 1999:268, here quoted from J0rgensen (1997:40 I), 
bold characters in original). 
Jorgensen (1997) himself represents an opposite position. His argument is, that the direction 
of the political in general and planning in particular, is - put simply - the subjugation of the 
political to pure economic calculations. He argues that the role of national and regional 
politics as a mean or corrective of the disruptive effects of the market - now in the globalised 
economy - to a considerable degree has disappeared, which he among others exemplifies 
from recent examples from Danish regional policy in the Greater Copenhagen Region. Hence, 
from this point of view, the important elements of the "balanced" and negotiated planning and 
policymaking have disappeared. 
In our opinion both of these directions can be stated from the Danish case, and the direction of 
the Danish planning system therefore be can seen as a growing ambivalence between (i) the 
participatory and welfare oriented and (ii) neo-corporate growth policy paradigms. This 
will be discussed further in the following. 
33 
The Present Ambivalence of Urban Planning in Denmark 
Briefly we can say that until the 1950's planning was dominated by the priority of the natural. 
Urbanisation was seen as a basically unnatural development, and town planning was seen as 
an instrument to avoid wrong development of the urban milieu. Architects and engineers 
argued for a balanced city-development based on ideals from rural villages (garden city 
planners), and the "traditional" village became a model for urban development, e.g. in the 
construction of streets and squares. 
During the 1950's rational planning took over and the city was seen as a centre for growth 
and development that could be managed by professional planners, based on functional 
principles. In the 1970's, as we have described above, planning became more a political-
administrative matter and the planning process was extended by participation from citizens 
and interest groups, and the attempts to integrate physical, economic and social objectives 
in the planning process (Worm et.al. 1984). We can say that in the 1970s the rational-
scientific perspective was extended - not replaced - by an integrative participatory welfare 
oriented planning. 
But as also stated above, integrative participatory planning came under attack in the new 
political conjuncture of the eighties. The integration of planning on different levels as the 
objective was regarded as a failure, and integrating physical, economic and social targets into 
one whole did not get much farther than the drawing board. Large-scale ambitions and 
participation were in many respects seen as costly and ineffective. 
At the discursive level the critique of total planning, functionalism and participatory planning 
was the starting point for the new ambivalent trends in the 1980's and 1990's. In this new 
trend the city is seen as an environment that constantly keeps on changing, and therefore 
definite plans for urban development are not possible at all. Urban planning must be 
incremental (Dicken 1998, 298 f). The profile of the Orestad project in terms of planning was 
the specific linkage between high aesthetic ideals and the corporate type of planning. The 
project designers linked the aesthetic and the corporate arguments in one package and 
presented it as e new a strategic tool in urban development. One of the leading proponents of 
the Orestad-project, Wichmann Matthiessen, sees the Orestad project as an indicator of this 
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new method and rationale. This - according to the author - necessary shift in rationale has 
occurred in the late 1980's and is conceptualised as a shift from equality to multiplicity 
orientation in planning (Wichmann Matthiessen unpubl., 40 ff.; se also Milj0ministeriet 
1989; 1990). 
While the planning strategy of the 1970's was oriented against welfare indicators such as 
decentralisation and equality, the new planning method favours a strategic growth perspective 
(Wichmann Matthiessen unpubl., 2). The strategic growth perspective is a planning method 
that extends the growth potentials of the city, i.e. talent, knowledge, enterprise and financial 
means. Public leadership is about the management of the growth potential and the tools to 
reach these goals can be derived from the ideas on management in economic life (Wichmann 
Matthiessen, unpubl.: 3, Matthiessen & Andersson 1993). We can say that in the strategic 
planning method aesthetic arguments and corporate structures float together in their advocacy 
of professionalism and high standards (in architecture, technology etc) and their belief in the 
market mechanism (Gaardmand 1993). 
The strategic growth method may be the dominating planning tool in the 1990's, though only 
one of the routes that planning in the 1990's is taken. As discussed in the first section the 
other route taken for example in the Urban Social Action programme is complete different. 
Here the key words are empowerment and participation. Hence our thesis about increasing 
ambivalence. 
The New "State Led Entrepreneurialism" 
The Danish UDP is a clear-cut example of the neo-corporate trend in the planning system. It 
was born in the combination of a particular political climate and the interaction between 
interests at different scales, which adequately can be labelled as a "new state led 
entrepreneurial ism". But this entrepreneurialism certainly is the result of the specific 
historical circumstances that we have described above. But to make the arguments of this 
assertion explicit, we wiIl go through this section by presenting the general historical 
processes that have shaped the development of Copenhagen since the 1970's, and hence laid 
the foundation for the UDP to prosper. 
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First of all it is important to note that Copenhagen municipality (together with Fredriksberg) 
never became a part of the municipal reform, but maintained a double role as both county and 
municipality. Copenhagen, therefore, never became a part of a larger regional political 
structure, but regional questions have been handled a special act and much weaker forum, the 
Greater Copenhagen Council. 
At the local level changes of great importance for the design of the UDP occurred through the 
1970's and 1980's. Social democrats that had dominated the municipal council since the 
beginning of the century, were heavily challenged in the 1970's by the growing strength of 
the New Left (Socialist Left Party) and the Old left (communists and Socialist Peoples Party). 
Besides this, a variety of urban movements entered the political stage and heavily criticised 
the Social Democratic Town Government. Alliances between social movements, and between 
social movements and political radicals created a turbulent "post-68" climate in the city 
(Andersen 199x). 
The situation between a traditional Social Democratic Town Government and the new urban 
movements became intense around 1980. For the urban movements and the left the traditional 
Social Democratic authoritarianism was personified in the Lord Mayor Egon Weidekamp as a 
"City King" and "Machine Politician". The pinnacle of this was a week long fight between 
locals and the police that took place in the streets of Noerrebro in 1981, provoked by the 
Municipal decision to remove a playground ("Byggeren") in the area. In reality the conflict 
was about the authoritarian non- participate style in the implementation of urban renewal 
schemes in the district. After this episode the political climate deteriorated even more, and the 
Municipality of Copenhagen got the label of being partly "ungovernable". 
During the 1970's Copenhagen municipality witnessed a socio-economic decline and this was 
a problem for the Conservative-Liberal government that came into office in 1982. An expert 
commission selected by the liberal home secretary Britta Schall Holberg pointed out two 
negative self-perpetuating mechanisms of the socio-economic crisis: I) industrial decline, lack 
of new growth and employment sectors and 2) increasing concentration of social excluded 
and other low income groups (The Copenhagen Report. Andersen et.al, 1984). Besides the 
expert report on the socio-economic decline nothing much happened on the practical side until 
the government abolished the Great Copenhagen Council in 1987, but this only extended the 
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problems of governing the city and the region. The government actually refused to negotiate 
the allocation of additional resources to Copenhagen based on political acknowledgement of 
over average social needs. 
But, as on the national level, a more consensus-like policy developed in the late 1980's within 
the Copenhagen municipality. A more flexible and participative orientation in the urban 
renewal had occurred along with a decline of the left-wing orientation, even though it left-
wing influence still is perceptible. A more pragmatic generation of Social Democrats entered 
the stage, now personified in the new Lord Mayor, Jens Kramer. And the right-wing parties as 
well have won wider public support within the Town. 
In the climate of the "ungovernability" of Copenhagen, its socio-economic decline and a new 
political consensus on Schumpetarian issues, an urban regime of "social democratic" or 
"state" entrepreneurialism emerged in the late 1980's. In the beginning of the 1990's, when 
the shift in social democratic leadership caused the road to a new national government in 1992 
with two minor social-liberal parties, the "hegemony" of this new urban regime became 
manifest. 
The Birth ofthe UDP 
The UDP was actually first designed by a group of professional city- and traffic planners in 
the late 1980's. The same actors usefully employed their extended network to create a 
common frame of reference for revitalising the economy of Copenhagen. The specific shape 
of the UDP developed in different stages, which in the more concrete phase involved the 
leaders of the national and local trade unions and the employers associations. The common 
framework to revitalise Copenhagen was to see it as a part of a broader regionalisation 
process: the promotions of the cross border Oeresund Region. Schumpetarian action was the 
important political rationale behind the Danish UDP, and within the more consensus-like 
climate the growth coalition that shaped the Danish UDP was formed. 
The key actors on the political scene became the Social Democratic Lord Mayor of 
Copenhagen (Jens Kramer) and the Conservative Minister of Finance, Henning Dyremose. At 
the national political level, the important argument in the first stages of the UDP was the 
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ability of the idea to generate an offensive growth policy. Interest groups within both the 
Conservative-Liberal government and the Social Democrats were interested in demonstrating 
their willingness to engage in Schumpetarian action. 
The "Growth Coalition" was able to suggest a future oriented international and offensive 
strategy for urban growth. They had three manifest arguments on their side that discarded 
nearly all criticism. The investment to the project was expense neutral because they would be 
regained by the sale of unused land to huge market prices as the value the ground expanded. 
The new urban space was linked to the construction of a METRO-system, that would reduce 
the effects from the growing car traffic substantially, and therefore there would be an 
environmental gain to get. Against these arguments criticism could be rejected at being to 
nostalgic and localist in its orientation and not taking the transformation towards the 
knowledge based economy seriously enough. 
An important factor in the promotion of the UDP, was the socio-economic decline of 
Copenhagen municipality during the 1970's. An expert commission selected by the liberal 
home secretary Britta Schall Holberg pointed out two negative self-perpetuating mechanisms 
of the socio-economic crisis: 1) industrial decline, lack of new growth and employment 
sectors and 2) increasing concentration of social excluded and other low income groups 
(Andersen, 1984). 
At the national level the ungovernability as well as the socio-economic crisis of Copenhagen 
was a problem for the Conservative-Liberal government that came into office in 1982. But 
besides the expert report on the socio-economic decline, the only radical decision of the 
Government regarding policy-tools was to abolish the Greater Copenhagen Council in 1987. 
The government actually refused to negotiate the allocation of additional resources to 
Copenhagen based on political acknowledgement of over average social needs. 
In the late eighties the more "hard-core" liberalism declined and the social liberal and centre 
forces increased their power on national level. New more consensus-like policy issue entered 
the political stage, centred on Schumpetarian issues (Jessop 1998). In the late 1980's the 
government negotiated labour market policy and entrepreneurial programmes with the Social 
Democratic party, e.g. education and training programs for the unemployed. Also within the 
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Copenhagen municipality, a more flexible and participate orientation in the urban renewal had 
occurred along with a decline of the left-wing orientation, even though it still is perceptible. A 
more pragmatic generation of Social Democrats entered the stage, now personified in the new 
Lord Mayor, Jens Kramer. And the right-wing parties as well have won wider public support 
within the Town. 
In the climate of the "ungovernability" of Copenhagen, its socio-economic decline and a new 
political consensus on Schumpetarian issues, an urban regime of "Social Democratic 
Entrepreneurialism" emerged in the late 1980's. In the beginning of the 1990's, when the shift 
in social democratic leadership caused the road to a new national government in 1992 with 
two minor social-liberal parties, the "hegemony" of this new urban regime became manifest. 
Financial Affairs 
The financial affairs are an important aspect of the Oerestad project. The financing of the 
project was one of the most central and controversial issues in the decision making process 
(Andersen 98, Gaardmand 91). 
In reality the current project combines two individual projects: (i) The development of a new 
part of the city on the piece of land on Amager, which since 1963 has been owned jointly by 
the state and the city of Copenhagen for that purpose. (ii) Expansion of the existing public 
transportation system, which would connect Amager with Frederiksberg through a metro 
system with its nexus in the central parts of Copenhagen. Both projects had been discussed 
since the early sixties (Gaardmand 1991, Municipal Plans for Copenhagen 1961; 1997, and 
interviews with former head of planning in Copenhagen Kai Lemberg). 
When the project, which led to the current Oerestad project was conceived in 1991 the idea 
came up to combine the two projects, partly by planning partly by the financing structure. The 
main reason for the combination of the two proj ects was that a low direct cost was essential 
for the project to be approved by the parliament, since the Conservative-Liberal Government 
was unwilling to allocate additional resources to Copenhagen. Investments in Copenhagen 
could tum out quite costly in terms of promises of similar investments in other parts of the 
country, and to heavy expenses could slow down the decision making process. The Oerestad 
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construction offered a solution to the need for redevelopment in Copenhagen, which seemed 
not to involve massive direct costs for the state. The financing of the joint project was linked 
with the aim of making the process almost self financing by using the revenues from the sale 
of land in the Oerestad to finance the building of the Metro. And later again, to use the 
revenues from the Metro to pay back the credits. So a project which otherwise would cost 
over I billion Euro would require only an initial outlay of some 150 million Euro. The 
financial rationale behind this structure is known as underwriting, which means that assets are 
being sold below their actual value to generate capital This capital is invested so the revenue 
is above the market interest, which makes up for the loss made by the sale and hopefully 
creates profit. The strategy has been used in the insurance business, where the asset was 
insurance policies. The idea behind underwriting is very much like the idea behind the rent 
concept, i.e. to create supernonnal profits. So in this sense the financing structure of the 
Oerestadlmetro proj ect was an attempt to create urban rent. 
However, where there is potential for supernonnal profits there is also potential for loses, and 
so is also the case for the Oerestadsproject. If the land is not sold fast enough, or does not 
provide the needed funds for the construction of the Metro, the whole financial foundation is 
likely to erode. The same applies if the cost of the metro is greater than anticipated or the 
project is very delayed. 
Of course there is some flexibility built into the system, but the financing only works if the 
variables are kept within a certain range. As the set-up is highly contingent and the project has 
a long time span (around 30 years) there is a multiplier effect, meaning that ifthe project goes 
off track the end result can be a large deficit. Retrospectively this means that it would have 
been cheaper to pay for the metro with public funds partly subsidised with whatever revenue a 
selling of the land used for the Oerestad could provide. 
Before the actual developments in the Oerestad are examined more closely, there is yet 
another aspect of the financing related to the budget, which is important to notice. This is the 
alteration the budget and the budgetary conditions have gone through since the start of the 
project. 
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The budget as such has not been altered from the approval but the initial outlay from the 
government was raised from 37.500.000 Euro to 150.000.000 Euro, this amount is not 
calculated in the total credit line, which is 850.000.000 Euro. 
Concerning the period for the payback of credits, i.e. the amount of time elapsed before the 
investments were covered and the credit of 850.000.000 plus the initial outlay of 150.000.000 
paid back to the state finances has been prolonged from around 11 years to around 20-22 
years (2020). While these changes do not per see affect the budget, they do affect the 
compounded interest, making the project potentially more vulnerable to fluctuations in the 
interest rate. 
The changes are not interesting seen isolated, but they highlight the nature of the project as 
being very unsure and based on assumptions and analysis, which are more political than 
practical in nature. As it will be shown later this construction has a high price in terms of 
public and political legitimacy. 
Below the financial statements of the ODC is shown, including the cost of running the ODC 
and the staff size. In these figures the credit limit has not been reached which appears from 
the balance sheet. The total credit limit is 850 million Euro and in 1997 figures the balance is 
3.8 billion Danish Kroner or 506 million Euro. However recent figures show that the credit 
limit is reached and that and additional 145 million Euro has been added to the total credit 
limit. Unfortunately the annual report for 1998 was not available. The notes referred to are not 
all of them enclosed in the report. 
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Figure 2: Profit and loss 
Profit and loss account for I st January - 31 st December 1997 (DKK 1,000) 
1997 1996 
Income 
Sale of sites 60,000 62,500 
Value of own work, Notes 3, 5 22,959 22,217 
Other operating income 5,589 1,310 
88,548 86,027 
Expenses 
Disposals of sites, Note 6 -59,983 -62,070 
Selling expenses - 10,338 - 1,392 
Staff expenses, Note I -14,853 -11,660 
Other external expenses -23,538 -23,898 
Depreciation, Note 2 -2,225 -1,912 
-110,937 -100,932 
Financial items 
Financial income 23,548 1,711 
Financial expenses -64,830 -23,804 
Capitalization of net financial 37,865 21,872 
expenses 
-3,417 -221 
I Result for the year -25,806 -15,126 
BALANCE SHEET AT 31ST DECEMBER 1997 
Fixed assets 
[DKK 1,000] 1997 1996 
Intangible fixed assets 
Leasehold improvements, Note 2 1,586 1,024 
Tangible fixed assets 
Construction of the Metro, Note 3 1,533,354 661,514 
Railway land, natural areas, etc. 0 0 
1,533,354 661,514 
Other tangible fixed assets 
Operating equipment, fixtures and fittings, Note 2 4,528 4,111 
1,537,882 665,625 
Financial fixed assets 
Participating interests in associated companies, Note 4 0 0 
Rent deposits, etc. 396 722 
396 722 
Total fixed assets 1,539,864 667,371 
Current assets 
Development of 0restad, Note 5 1,140,381 174,370 
Other land holdings, Note 6 202,711 262,604 
Accounts receivable,Note 7 
Accounts receivable from Frederiksbergbaneselskabet liS 368,080 142,261 
Accounts receivable from 0stamagerbaneselskabet liS 17,643 8,966 
Other accounts receivable 42,448 53,616 
428,171 204,843 
Cash funds 500,055 64,437 
Total current assets 2,271,318 706,254 
I Total assets 3,811, 182 1,373,625 
42 
Liabilities 
[DKK 1,000] 
Equity,Note 8 
Paid-up share capital 
Adjustments 
Transferred 
Fixed liabilities,Note 9 
Debenture loan 
Current liabilities,Note 9 
Bank loans 
Trade creditors 
Other debt, Note 10 
ITotal equity and liabilities 
Contingent liabilities, Note II 
NOTES 
Note I Staff expenses 
[DKK 1,000] 1997 
Wages and salaries 12,929 
Pension contributions 1,479 
Other s~cial security 426 
contnbutIOns 
Other staff expenses 19 
14,853 
Of which: 
Salaries to Executive I 084 
Management ' 
Emoluments to Board 320 
of Directors 
Emoluments to 40 
0restad Council 
Average no. of staff in 1997 was 30 (24 in 1996). 
Source: Annual report from the ODC 1997 
1997 
436,694 
902,657 
-41,881 
1,297,470 
2,139,194 
192,682 
53,562 
128,274 
374,518 
3,811,182 
1996 
9,826 
1,343 
407 
84 
11,660 
953 
323 
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Current Developments in the Land Sale 
1996 
436,694 
0 
-16,075 
420,619 
599,936 
214,750 
63,399 
74,921 
353,070 
1,373,625 
Over the last month there has been a rapid development in the land sale in the Oerestad, 
which is quite interesting as the development has not only affected the amount of land sold 
but also the buyers of the land. It appears that most of the new investments in the Oerestad are 
public. Public institutions, which has planned their relocation to the Oerestad account for 
almost 6 billion DKK (around 800.000.000 Euro) of public investments. It should be noted 
that not all of the projects are finally decided at this point. Below is a description of the 
planned public investments. 
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Project Status Total public investment 
In Euro 
The university of Copenhagen The project has been approved 228,000,000 over 7-10 years 
but there are still some 
discussions about the price 
The IT High School Approved 48.400.000 over ca. 3 years 
A research park Approved, the project is not 45.700.000 over ca. 3 years 
entirely public but will mainly be 
based on public funding 
The national archive and the Has been approved 201.600.000 over ca. 5 years 
Royal Library 
The National Television Has not yet been approved, 269.000.000 over ca. 5 years 
pending further negotiations 
Total 792.700.000 
Total approved 523.700.000 
It would appear that this somewhat changes the negative scenario concerning the financial 
affairs. 
Concerning the sale to private companies, this has been limited (we do not have any accurate 
estimates) but the largest single project is still the (conditioned) selling of 330.000 square 
metres to a large development company. The sale is set up as follows, there are three lots of 
110.000 square metres, and the company buys one now in order to build a large shopping 
centre, and has an option on the two other lots. However, the centre can only be build on the 
condition that the plans gets an approval by the Ministry of Environmental affairs. For the 
time being, the Ministry does not give any approvals to new shopping centres, as they are 
awaiting a nation-wide report on the development in retail sales. 
The Oerestad law contains a paragraph, which states that it is to house a regional shopping 
centre, so the approval should according to the ODC be a formality. The other clause of the 
option is that around 60 % of the area in which the centre is to be situated in should be sold, 
by the time the centre gets built. With the new public investments this should not pose as a 
problem. If the project gets the approval as expected the first phase of a sale netting 
888,300,000 Euro is entered, with the first instalment of296,000,000 Euro already secured. 
However, there is yet another issue concerning this sale, which has an impact on the total 
revenue for the land sale. The options are priced at 269 Euro/square metre, but the current 
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pnce is 309 Eurol square metre, so if the company uses all the options the Oerestad 
Development Company will loose 13,300,000 Euro that they could have earned, had they sold 
the land at the current price level. 
Overall Financial Status in the Oerestad Company 
The numbers below illustrate the potential revenue fi'om the land sale at this point and the 
actual revenue generated. 
Total potential revenue from public investments: 
Total potential revenue from the options held by 
the development company Steen & Stroem NS: 
Total potential revenue from land already sold: 
Total potential revenue from land sale: 
792,700,000 Euro 
888,300,000 Euro 
57,065,000 Euro 
1,738,065,000 Euro 
Only a fraction of this total revenue has been realised, at this point. The actual value of the 
land sale at this point runs in 57,065,000 Euro. This amount covers all binding private and 
public agreements. This does not mean that the money has been paid, so the actual amount in 
hard cash generated from land sale is shown below 
Total realised revenue from land already sold: 11,844,000 Euro 
Below is a representation of the relative relationship between the total potential revenue, the 
potential revenue from land already sold and the actual realised revenue. 
Total potential revenue: 
Total potential revenue from land already sold: 
Total realised revenue from land already sold: 
100.00% 
3.30% 
0.68% 
4S 
This discrepancy indicates that there is still a long way to go before the financial crisis can be 
said to be over. 
The "Point of No Return" and the Spirit of "the Three Musketeers" 
In the public the Analysis of the financial affairs made by the United Left Party (later picked 
up by the weekly magazine Monday Moming) , already in 1997 questioned the financial 
construction. According to these analysis the company has used almost all the credit and since 
the revenue of the land sale does not cover the expenses, this will lead to "death by interest". 
This means that the compounded interest on the debt for the construction of the Metro and the 
infrastructure of the Oerestad will exceed the revenue produced from the Metro and the 
selling of land. The analysis estimates that the project is likely to cost the taxpayers up to 1-2 
billion Euro. 
For the growth coalition the present situation of the Danish UDP (less than half way through 
the implementation phase) is characterised by at "point of no retum" - as the present Minister 
of Traffic Sonja Mikkelsen (Social Democrat) termed it in one of the recent debates in the 
Danish Parliament (Infom1ation, 1999 May I st.). Despite the ongoing crossing of the original 
budget (which from an objective point of view so far has proven that many of the critics was 
right in their scepticism) when the three parties (Social Democrats, the Liberal and The 
Conservative Party), who passed the legislation about the UDP through the Parliament in 
1992) is still characterised by a "Spirit of the Musketeers". 
The "Musketeers" invested their political prestige in the "politics of gambling", i.e. the belief 
in "offensive entrepreneurial ism" in the hands of high profiled charismatic "New 
Developers". For them the calculations seem to be that the political and economical costs by 
accepting increased public investments is lower than opening up for a fundamental economic 
and legal reorganisation of the UDP. 
The latest strategic move late 1998 from the ODC and the growth coalition was to replace the 
Director of IBM, Joem Melgard with Henning Christoffersen former EU-Commissioner and 
fom1er Minster of Finance Denmark. The profile of Henning Christoffersen has several 
advantages in the present critical situation of the ODC. He is well respected for his leadership. 
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His professional record as a senous, reliable vice-president of the European Commission 
during the Presidency of Jacque Delors is well known. He is also member of the Liberal 
Party. The latter merit was a tactical advantage for the ODC because the "weakest link" in the 
chain of the three Musketeers is the Liberal Party. Important sections of this party was critical 
towards the ODC in the design phase because: 
(i) The party was critical towards accepting additional state resources to the Capital, and 
is by tradition on the anti Copenhagen side in its political geography 
(ii) The growing financial problems and the critique from local branches of the chosen 
METRO has created increasing criticism against the whole set-up of the ODe. 
Contemporary political analysts in Denmark (e.g. David Rehling at the newspaper 
Infonnation and fonner chair of Dansk Natur Fredningsforening, who was active in 
negotiation with the ODC in the design phase) at present argues that the instalment of 
Henning Christoffersen as new chair of the ODC probably will be able to increase the 
reliability of the ODC enough to avoid a split in the growth coalition. If Christoffersen had 
not been mobilised the Director of the ODC, Anne Grethe Foss would probably have been 
"sacrificed" . 
The tactical style put foreward by Henning Christoffersen since the spring 1999 is a change 
compared with the fonner "lets wait and see" attitude of the ODC. It is now openly stated 
that it is impossible to calculate the size of an necessary increased credit. 
With regard to the financial situation of the ODC there are several jokers at present (refer to 
the former section on financial affairs): 
(i) The entrepreneurs who contracted with the ODC have gone to the court and demanded 
huge financial compensations due to inadequate descriptions in the licitation and 
other complications. 
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(ii) A number of still undiscovered technical problems in the METRO-project questions 
not only the still unknown total prize but - according to some critics - the entire 
technical possibility of the total project. 
Here it should be added that the chosen type of traffic investment of the ODC from the 
beginning has been criticised for: 
- binding a substantial part of the investment to an imagined new town instead of choosing a 
type of investment, which focused on the reduction of the existing car traffic. The raised 
criticism also refers to the lack of negotiations and co-ordination with the existing 
institutions namely the Copenhagen Region Traffic Company (HT) and the Danish Railway 
Company (DSB). These two old actors were excluded from the planning processes for 
which the ODC was responsible. 
(iii) The speed and size of the realisation of the cornerstone in the financial set-up, i.e. the 
profits from sale of building sites to private investors. 
As documented before the income from land sale to private investors has been disappointing. 
The ODC in its official accountings argues that the income from selling building sites is 460 
million D.kr. The critics argue that (i) a large part of the stated income is "Matador money" 
and (ii) the other part is public investments for the tax payers money - including pure "gifts" 
from the state. The critics argued that the growth coalition has organised a sequence of 
financial "cover-up actions" in favour of the ODC. These actions are very illustrative in order 
to demonstrate how the "growth" coalition has operated in the implementation phase. 
The dominant actor in these operations is the Ministry of Finance. During 1998 the Ministry 
encouraged public institutions to pay attention to the Orestad building sites, if they considered 
to move their offices. The Ministry promised to be helpful to find additional resources since 
the price of building sites in the Orestad are some of the highest in the Region 
Other supportive actions took place already in 1994. Here the Ministry of Finance in its yearly 
negotiation with the Municipality of Copenhagen agreed to pay 150 million D.kr to the 
Municipality for three building sites at the PortlHarbour front, which they had shared 
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ownership to. The total value was 400 million D.kr. This "discrete" state contribution was 
immediately passed on to the Orestads Company. Right now a similar manoeuvre is planned 
by the growth coalition, but with much higher financial volumes. The plan (according to the 
Newspaper Information) is that the Copenhagen Harbour Company (CHC) which operates 
under a construction similar to that of the ODC, should hand over a substantial part of its 
building cites to the State Property Company, FREJA - and the ODC. 
The CHC has been criticised along similar lines as the ODC: the constructions with its 
emphasis on market driven development on the many building cites on the Copenhagen 
Harbour Front tend to exclude districts and politicians from controlling and deciding the City 
planning. 
Unlike the ODC, the CHC has so far been more successful in creating income from selling 
building sites to private investors. In fact the CHC have so far ousted the ODC. Via the 
planned operation of including the substantial parts of the CHC sites in a co-ordinated state 
controlled framework including the ODC a lot of possibilities for "discrete" state contribution 
will occur. 
In the following some of the recent political turbulence associated with the ODC at Municipal 
and state level will be outlined. 
I. In the Danish Parliament a permanent committee for financial control of public affairs is 
preparing a report about the financial transactions of the ODC. This report, which will be 
realised in a couple of months, will probably criticise the financial management. The way 
the Parliament will respond to the expected criticism can be crucial for the survival of the 
ODC in its present form. The growth coalition will - like the ODC - argue that when the 
bridge to Sweden opens - the building site market will change and the ODC will be able to 
increase its income from land sale substantially. One scenario therefore could be that the 
ODC in its present form would survive a couple of years more. The growth coalition and 
the "Musketeer spirit" might survive and support another period of the "politics of 
gambling". 
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However, the sequence of events described above has already seriously questioned the 
general legitimacy of the type of planning and management which the ODC embodies. 
The combination of lack of democratic control and the increasingly questionable technical 
and financial management is - when it does not demonstrate efficiency - very vulnerable. 
2. At the Municipal level the possible future financial costs due to the crisis of the ODC has 
been articulated by the United Left and other members of the Copenhagen City Council. 
The Mayor of Schools in Copenhagen Per Bregengard, representing this party has for 
example calculated that the price for paying back the debts of the ODC will be an 
increased tax level 0.7 pet. pr year in a 20 year period (the share of Copenhagen stocks in 
the ODC is 45%). (Press release from XX) 
However at this stage the Municipal part of the growth coalition seems to agree with the 
statement from the Minister of Traffic that a "point of no return" has been passed. If the 
scenario of critics like Per Bregengard turns out to be reality there is not doubt that a new 
critical situation will occur in the City Council as well. 
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III Policy lessons 
Before jumping to concrete policy suggestions, some broader theoretical reflections about 
conditions for politics of inclusion will be outlined, and should be read as the policy 
implications of the previous presented analysis. 
From the social exclusion angle the implications of the shift from "government to multi scaled 
governance" creates the following set of problems: 
(i) The problem of new elite formation at the top of the social ladder 
(ii) The fragmentation and weakening of power of collective actors representing and 
articulating the interest of the less affluent 
(iii) The problem of fostering coalitions between excluded groups and sections of working 
and middle classes 
Politics of inclusion must try to: 
(i) Integrate actors representing interest at the bottom of the social ladder and 
(ii) Enable the actors to operate across different spatial levels: the local, regional, national and 
global. Inclusive counter forces cannot operate exclusively on local, regional or national 
levels. 
In the debate over new policy agendas the broader concept of empowerment (despite the 
origins of the concept in third world action research) of (potential) losers has gained new 
terrain (Craig and Mayo 1995, Friedmann, 1995). In short empowerment is a process of 
awareness and capacity building leading to greater participation, to greater decision-making 
power and control, and to transformative action (Karl, 1995:14). 
Taking the postfordistipostindustrial socio-economic and political-cultural landscape into 
account compared to traditional industrial society, it is obvious that the politics of 
empowerment and inclusion must be able to: 
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(i) take "particularities" into account (class, gender, generation, ethnicity etc.) and 
(ii) cope with the task of transforming these "particularities" into stable - but flexible 
coalitions which can operate at the different levels. The challenge is to identify 
potentials for remobilisation of "old" actors (the still existing although diminished 
working class) and empowerment of new actors representing excluded groups. 
In the present period the vague contours of a counter hegemonic project would include 
notions of socio-cultural diversity and social inclusion: social differentiation without social 
exclusion (Young (l98X) 
* the inclusive and multicultural City based on notion of social justice and inclusion 
* the Green and sustainable City based on ecological reasoning 
* the non elitist and beautiful City based on non elitist aesthetic reasoning 
Generally speaking this could be supported at the level of system integration by combination 
of universali st social citizenship rights and politics of "positive selectivism" e.g. 
empowerment oriented urban social action programs in deprived neighbourhoods. When they 
work, they empower local actors and transform the public agencies and the professional 
complex in a more supportive direction and give rise to empowering or "inclusive localism". 
But without more far-reaching changes in the socio-economic regime, which among other 
things can break the trend towards the exclusive "middle class localism", local empowerment 
strategies are likely to fail. 
Today both the role of the nation state as the locus of the political and the pattern of action 
arising from distinct social formations have changed. However, this does not mean that social 
hierarchies have disappeared. On the contrary the actors at the top of the social ladder have 
increased their power resources. 
From a social polarisation angle the lack of collective action from the bottom is the problem. 
The ability to organise collective action (empowerment) and political representation from the 
bottom - and therefore the presence of organised conflictive relationship between the affluent 
and the less affluent - is a condition for reaching sustainable, negotiated social contracts in 
society: Social inclusion and integration is impossible without social conflict 
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The notion of social inclusion/integration should therefore be developed to include the 
distinction between exclusionary "socially unproductive" versus inclusive "socially 
productive" types of conflicts. 
A socially unproductive type of conflictive relationship between actors tends to produce self-
reinforcing paths of zero or minus sum games. The intended or unintended social costs of 
collective action at the top or middle of the social ladder are externalised to the bottom of the 
social hierarchy. This is set in motion through "voting with feet" and/or the "politics of 
enforcement" types of dynamics, which increase social polarisation (i.e. economic inequality, 
socio-spatial segregation etc.). The conflictual relationships and mutual di strust between 
actors increases the transactions costs, which on a long term basis can cause crisis at the level 
of system integration (Jordan, 1996). 
The socially productive, transformative type of conflictive relationship can be defined as 
types of conflicts between actors allowing for plus sum games and, depending on the type of 
society in question, eventually to a transformation of the social order. These games increase 
positive incentives, mutual understanding and social learning of collective and individual 
actors and can thereby SUppOlt the ongoing dynamics of collective citizenship, reduce 
transactions costs and enhance social capital; the nonns and networks facilitating collective 
action for mutual benefit (Andersen, 1999) 
The return of Social Democratic and centre forces in governments in countries like France, 
Denmark, and the UK have rejected the neo-liberal path of the eighties in some ways. In areas 
like education/human capital investments they have for a long time argued in favour of a more 
offensive "Schumpeterian" type of growth politics, including an more offensive human capital 
investment strategy. The other type of Schumpetarianism, which unites liberal, conservative 
and Social Democratic leaders is an more agressive urban and regional revitalisation 
strategies. 
In the knowledge or infOlmation society "educational citizenship" is definitely important in 
shaping future patterns of social stratification (Esping-Andersen, 1995). But from a social 
polarisation perspective the key question is whether an "elitistlmeritocratic" or an 
inclusive/egalitarian version of the "knowledge race" will win? 
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On the supply side, the crucial question is to what extent increased human capital investment 
will be linked to educational citizenship. For example, combining improved quality of the 
educational institutions and programs of positive selectivism for educationally disadvantaged 
groups such as the elderly, manual redundant workers, ethnic minorities, or additional 
resources to schools in deprived neighbourhoods. If this is not the case, it may well be 
implemented in such a way that meritocratic mechanisms of exclusion will be reinforced. 
On the demand side of the economy, the question is how to reach a balanced type of labour 
market and socio-economic development that not only benefits the mobile, affluent and well 
skilled. In this debate critical analysts suggest that social economy grounded in local social 
movements and concerned to empower the poor and underprivileged could provide more 
effective solutions by developing a more self-sufficient economy, which is also able to re-
insert itself into the wider economy (Moulart et.al , 1994. Jessop, 1998). 
Inclusive economic and social development implemented through educational citizenship and 
a new social economy requires the empowerment of actors (the social integration level) and 
institutional refornls (the system integration level). This presupposes a new social economy 
strategy, where the economic is re-embedded in the social , and the effective co-ordination of 
institutional arrangements creating "structured coherence" at the micro-, meso-, macro- and 
metalevels to ensure the dynamic complementarity of the social economy with the wider 
economic system (Jessop, 1998). Negotiating could for example do: 
1) The creation of service jobs 
2) Packages of (re)educationlactive labour market policy 
3) Housing market regulations taking e.g. low income households interests into as an 
integrated part ofUDP. 
This leads us to a closer discussion about the policy lesson to be drawn. 
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Lessons Arising from the Danish Case Study 
The platform of the URSPIC-project defines the task as grasping the complexity of social 
conflicts and power struggles which shapes UDPs in their design phase, their implementation 
and the long-term outcomes in terms of integration-exclusion. 
The lessons which can be drawn from the analysis is even more complex than understanding 
what happened and why. There is no simple way of turning the analysis of what happened, 
how and why around into reflections about what could be done instead. 
One first useful, all though mostly analytical, distinction is to distinguish between lessons 
concerned with: 
(i) Conditions for "defensive harm reduction": that is conditions for improving the 
possibilities for influencing the design, implementation and outcome of UDP without 
fundamentally changing the strategic character ofthe projects. This could be called the 
defensive agenda: the avoidance of increased political, economic and social 
disempowerment of the less powerful and affluent groups. 
(ii) Conditions for offensive counter hegemonic politics of inclusion in the urban space. 
(iii) The challenge of strengthening the (potential for) social and political empowerment 
opening up for alternative agendas, which takes the political, social and institutional 
context into account. 
In the design phase and at least in the first part of the implementation phase the growth 
coalition and the UDP leadership can often mobilise a strong discursive power by defining 
offensive agenda for future social, aesthetic and economic development. Critics tend to be 
classified as defensive actors and thus excluded from the discourse. They become associated 
with old-fashioned "politics of resistance" belonging to ancient (modem) times. Unlike the 
"New Developers" - capable of leading the City in to the (postmodem) world of tomorrow 
and situated in the upper end of the social hierarchy - the critics are only occasionally able 
mobilise powerful discursive counter agency. This situation of asymmetrical relations of 
power - in particular the fragmented power base for marginalised and excluded strata - creates 
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difficult conditions for the linkage of urban (re)development with notion of inclusion and 
social justice. 
In the classical social democratic city Urban Planning was closely linked to Social Reform 
(Friedman, 1987) The power base was the alliance between relative homogenous social 
formations as the working class, progressive sections of the middle classes and offensive 
modem planners. 
The Problem of UDP Irreversibility and the "Spirit of the Musketeers" 
The case study demonstrated that a major problem in the implementation of large-scale UDPs 
is that the "point of no return" makes it difficult to redirect UDPs once they are set in motion. 
UDPs of the type examined in the URSPIC-project have a very strong element of "politics of 
gambling". In the public Danish debate around the ODC the term "politics of illusionism" has 
been introduced 
One simple but important lesson is the necessity of insisting on mechanisms to ongoing public 
control of financial transactions and clearly defined procedures and responsibility for budget 
excess. 
Such mechanisms can take a variety of concrete forms. For example the presence of 
representatives outside the growth coalition in the Steering Committee of UDPs. In the 
Danish case the presence of representatives from the surrounding deprived districts might 
have made a (refer e.g. to the Dutch-case). Another example could be to insist on for example 
yearly independent evaluations by independent agencies outside the UDP. 
The irony in the Danish and other UDPs is that the financial concept in the design phase was 
more or less cost neutrality for tax payers and public budgets, because market driven 
development and urban rent would finance the investments. What really happened in the 
implementation phase was massive increase in use of pure public credits and (re )directions of 
public investments to the UDP. 
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Subsidiarity and the Role of Regional Government 
One important lesson at the institutional level is about the complicated problem of 
subsidiarity - the division of tasks and competence between local/district level, the level ofthe 
city/municipality, the level of the region, the level of the nation state and the 
supranational/EU level - from the social exclusion-integration angle in order to identify 
obstacles for politics of inclusion. 
The Danish case suggest two lessons: 
- the importance of active involvement in the design as well as implementation phase and the 
existence of elected district councils within the Capital. Deprived districts needs their own 
political and institutional platform in order to articulate their demands. 
- the lack of an elected regional government (since the late eighties) with planning 
competence in the Greater Copenhagen Region made easier the formation of closed neo-
corporativist closed elite formation. 
In the following discussion the emphasis will be on the regional level. 
The very existence of a regional level of government with a strong political mandate seems to 
be one of the conditions for articulation of reliable politics of alternative development at this 
level. As demonstrated in the case study the formation of a quasi-public and highly 
autonomous development agency (the Orestad Development Company, ODC) was path-
shaping in relation to existing procedures for public participation in urban planning 
The absence of a regional level of government was one among other factors, which has 
created at situation of planning and socio-economic dislocation in the Copenhagen Region 
with regard to traffic investment and regulations of urban (re-)development. This left the 
Municipality of Copenhagen in a very weak bargaining position vis-it-vis the State. 
The "New Developers/Entrepreneurs" in the latter Oerestads Company were ambitious 
gamblers, when they designed a new "Copenhagen growth package". In the open terrain of 
long lasting Municipal budget deficits and a weaker economic base they offered a path-
shaping growth package, where profits (urban rent) from selling virgin land in a new 
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development zone could finance the huge traffic investment. The latter had been blocked due 
to financial and institutional-political struggles between the state, the Municipality of 
Copenhagen and the Greater Copenhagen Council (GCC). The GCC had been paralysed by 
struggles between the poor Social Democratic and Left governed Copenhagen and the mostly 
richer Conservative-Liberal Municipalities outside Copenhagen and was finally closed down 
by the Conservative-Liberal government in the late eighties. 
The absence of a regional government increases the room of manoeuvre for the neo-
corporative alliances between the offensive (corporativist oriented) state and defensive 
Municipalities. In the Copenhagen case actors in the professional complex (planners etc.) 
were dominant actors in the design phase and via their corporate networks they succeeded in 
opening a new "strategic terrain" in a situation of (political and socio-economic) dislocation. 
Holistic inclusive planning - Suggestions 
However the presence of regional political authority does not by its very existence guarantee 
sufficient counterbalancing forces, which can influence the form and content of action. Even 
more important is the need for a new type of holistic planning objectives which includes 
living conditions like housing, adult education, social and health services and active labour 
market policy and job possibilities for those in the risk zone of social exclusion. Further more 
an ecological orientation: or rather linking the notions of ecological and social sustainability. 
The Agenda 21 movement should also include the regional level. 
Among the instruments and tools which should be considered is tax policies. With regard to 
income taxes a major problem is related to the fact that affluent groups tends to work in the 
City Centre, but lives outside the City and thus pays their Municipal tax to rich 
Municipalities. Furthermore the rich Municipalities are effective closed for low-income 
groups due to the composition of their housing market. This is one of the polarising 
mechanisms which could be changed iftaxation of income to a larger extent would benefit the 
Municipality in which the workplace is located. 
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Suggestion: 
Regional pilot projects in Europe with development of holistic and participatory planning 
instruments with emphasis on the total set of living conditions: housing, social services, 
employment, education. In Denmark there were attempts to develop this type of planning in 
the late seventies and in political and professional discource these ideas still play a role. 
(Worm et.al, 1984) 
Instead of assuming an automatic trickle down effect the EU-institutions should demand 
mechanisms and objectives, which stimulates inclusive and sustainable development. The 
EU-institutions and programmes (e.g. the Social Fund, the INTERREG-programme) should 
define a set of conditions for financial support to regional and urban revitalisation 
programmes in order to be sure that UDPs are part of a coherent regional socio-economic 
strategy. 
Such conditions could be: 
1) To identify and estimate the need for housing for low income groups - and to develop a 
long term regional housing policy. This should be done in co-operation with NGOs 
representing the homeless and Social Housing Associations representing housing interests 
for low-income groups. The objective should be to avoid concentration of high- income 
groups in particular districts, homelessness and deprived ghetto's. The principle of income 
and ethnic mixed residential areas should be the leading principle. This means that e.g. 
Social Housing projects should be given the highest priority in affluent Municipalities, 
which otherwise tend to use housing policy as an instrument of social closure and thereby 
over time reinforce socio-spatial polarisation. Democracy and social citizenship in part 
build on socially and cultural diversity in residential areas in order to make possible that 
face to face relations with "the others" can be developed. If this increasingly becomes 
impossible the development of mutual distrust between social formations can escalate 
(Blakely and Snyder, 1997; Jordan 1996). 
2) Identify and estimate needs for adult education and job creation - and to develop a long 
term strategy for active labour market and educational policy - with focus on unskilled and 
vulnerable segments of the local labour market. Such efforts includes development or 
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strengthening of existing agencies to support job creation in service sector jobs on nonnal 
wage conditions, programmes of tailored active labour market policy. Support to third 
sector initiatives social enterprises, conununity groups and social co-operatives, which 
have or can develop their capacity to develop new types of jobs and socially meaningful 
life spaces. 
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Appendix 1 
List of persons interviewed: 
Arne Melchior, member of the parliament for the Centre Democrats, former Minister of 
Transportation and Turism, observer in the political group overseing the activities of the 
ODe. 
Kai Lemberg, Former head of the planning department in the Municipality of Copenhagen, 
Honourrary professor at Roskilde University. 
Lau Melchiorsen, Head of Sales and Development in the ODe. 
Klaus Ahm, Head of financial affairs in the ODC 
Christian Wichmann Mathiessen, Professor in Geography at Copenhagen university, Head of 
the Geographical department, author of severeal books and papers on the Oeresund region and 
regional development, participant in the report on the Oeresund region 
Uffe Paludan, Director of the Copenhagen Institute for Future Studies, participant in the 
report on the Oeresund region. 
Vagn Smed, Editor of the district newspaper, SydVest Folkeblad. 
Gunna Starck, Former Mayor with responsibilty for physical planning and member ofthe City 
Council in Copenhagen for the Socialist Left Party and the United Left. 
Karl Voigt, Secretary for MP, Soren Kolstrup. Leading profile in NOAH 
Mikkel Warming, former member of the Steering Comittee of the Orestads Compagny, 
member ofthe Copenhagen City Council for the Socialist Peoples Party. 
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Appendix 2 
Table 1. 
Number of workplaces in manufacturing- and service sector jobs 1970-1994 in the 
Copenhagen Region. 
Manufacturing: Number in thousands Growth-rate in pet. 
1970 1980 1986 1993 1994 70-80 80-86 86-93 93-94 
Copenhagen 100 55 44 31 27 -4,5 -3,3 A,3 -12,1 
Frederiksberg 12 6 4 4 4 A,8 -5,6 -1,2 8,7 
Copenhagen County 79 57 65 55 50 -2,9 2,4 -2,2 -9,6 
Fred.borg County 25 25 26 23 21 0,1 0,6 -1,5 8,2 
Roskilde County 15 II 14 14 13 2,6 4,2 0,1 -11,9 
Hovedstadsregionen 231 154 153 127 114 -3,3 -0,1 -2,4 -10,2 
Denmark 600 511 542 502 463 -1 ,5 1,0 -1,1 -7,8 
Service sector jobs: 
1970 1980 1986 1993 1994 70-80 80-86 86-93 93-94 
Copenhagen 275 204 315 277 276 -2,6 9,1 -1,7 -0,5 
Frederiksberg 32 33 36 34 35 0,2 1,8 -0,8 2,5 
Copenhagen County 115 230 249 278 280 10,0 1,3 1,7 0,7 
Fred.borg County 60 97 109 119 119 6,2 2,1 1,4 0,1 
Roskilde County 32 57 64 70 72 7,7 1,9 1,5 1,9 
Hovedstadsregionen 514 621 773 779 782 2,1 4,1 0,1 0,4 
Denmark 1263 1833 2006 1968 1989 4,5 1,6 -0,3 1,1 
Source: Munk, Anders (1998). Statens Byggeforskningsinstitut, H0rsholm. 
Table 2. 
Relative distribution of persons liable to tax, by taxable income in pet. 
Under 74999 75000-124999 125000-199999 200000-299999 over 300000 
Part of Copenhagen 
lndre By 20,2 24 25,4 20 10,5 
Christianshavn 20,1 30,3 25 17,1 7,6 
lndre 0sterbro 20,7 25,8 26,7 18,9 7,9 
Y dre 0sterbro 18,3 30,8 28,5 16,7 5,8 
lndre N0rrebro 21 ,3 37,3 25,2 12,8 3,4 
Y dre N0rrebro 20,6 38,5 27 11,7 2,2 
Vesterbro 21,4 36,5 27,2 12,1 2,8 
Kongens Enghave 19 40,5 29,1 10 1,3 
Valby 18,1 32,4 30,8 15 3,6 
Vanl0se 17,4 26,9 31,7 18,4 5,4 
Bmnshej-Husum 19,6 32,3 28,7 14,9 4,6 
Bispebjerg 17,3 39,5 28,9 11,9 2,4 
Sundby Nord 19,3 34,6 30,5 13,4 2,1 
Sundby Syd 18,8 30,4 31,4 15,7 3,7 
Vestamager 17,6 32,8 31,7 15 2,9 
Copenhagen total 19,6 32,7 28,6 14,9 4,3 
Source Denmarks Statistical Office and Copenhagen Statistical Office. 
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Table 3. 
People liable to tax having moved to or from Copenhagen 
Number of taxable people Taxable income in mio. Kr. Avg. taxable income in ths. 
Moved to Moved from Moved to Moved from Moved to Moved from 
Part a 
Copenhagen 
Indre By 2350 1836 346 317 147,4 172,5 
Christianshavn 652 463 94 77 144 166,8 
Indre 0sterbro 3951 3078 511 504 129,5 163,7 
Y dre 0sterbro 2290 2033 295 324 128,7 159,3 
Indre Nerrebra 2321 1804 268 248 115,3 137,3 
Ydre Nerrebro 3489 2797 397 399 113,9 142,7 
Vesterbra 3303 2545 376 348 113,8 136,8 
Kongens Enghave 1080 856 126 120 11 6,2 139,8 
Valby 2864 250 1 365 375 127,5 150 
Vanlese 2424 2150 330 345 136 160,3 
Brenshej-Husum 1758 1502 226 227 128,5 151,2 
Bispebjerg 2677 2214 318 326 118,8 147,3 
Sundby Nord 2952 2356 344 329 116,4 139,6 
Sundby Syd 2690 2190 314 314 11 6,7 143,5 
Vestamager 559 463 67 64 119,2 138,6 
Copenhagen Total* 35363 39409 4376 4384 123,7 149,1 
*Incl. People not In the Itst 
Source: Denmarks Statistical Office and Copenhagen Statistical Office 
Table 4 
Dwelling by ownership in pet. 
January 1998 
Private Private Social Housing Co-operative State or Total in real 
Owner- renting housing municipality numbers 
ship owned 
Part of Copenhagen 
Indre By 18,0 50,2 3,9 21,4 6,4 15632 
Christianshavn 23,0 36,0 17,3 22,7 1,0 4775 
Indre 0sterbro 17,8 41,7 6,2 31,8 2,5 26786 
Y dre 0sterbro 17,9 29,7 23,3 28,9 0,2 21056 
I ndre N errebra 9,3 40,2 15,8 30,7 3,9 16962 
Ydre Neffebro 10,5 27,5 19,9 42,0 0,0 23153 
Vesterbro 11,4 33,9 4,3 48,2 2,1 19362 
Kongens Enghave 14,2 22,5 49,8 13,4 0, 1 9782 
Valby 23,7 26,3 23,0 26,8 0,2 24145 
Vanlese 3 1,6 29,3 14,0 24,9 0,1 20842 
Brenslll,j -Husum 29,0 13 ,4 45 ,4 10,0 2,2 19590 
Bispebjerg 11 ,8 28,8 33,4 26,0 0,0 23929 
Sundby Nord 12,5 33,5 20,4 33,4 0,1 23772 
Sundby Syd 32,7 28,9 16,1 22,3 0,1 24584 
Vestamager 8,9 57,3 2,5 3 1,2 0,1 4826 
Copenhagen total* 18,7 31,8 19,8 28,4 1,2 279196 
Source: Denmarks Statistical Office and Copenhagen Statistical Office 
Table 5. 
Commuters with employment by sex and occupational 
status in pct. 
1.1. 1996 
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Commuters to Copenhagen Employed working & living Commuters from CPR. 
in Cph. 
Employment Men Women total Men Women total Men Women Total 
status 
Independent and 32,5 34,1 33,0 67,5 65,9 67,0 11,7 10,7 11 ,4 
working spouse 
High ranked 72, 1 58,2 66, 1 27,9 4 1,8 33,9 48,2 40,0 44,2 
white-collar 
White-collar other 57,7 60,4 59,5 42,3 39,6 40,5 43,6 33,5 37,3 
Skilled workers 61,3 50,5 59,8 38,7 49,5 40,2 53,7 41 ,5 52,0 
unscilled workers 45,2 32,7 39,3 54,8 67,3 60,7 44,2 32,2 38,5 
Wage eamer not 44,8 41,8 43,3 55,2 58,2 56,7 38,7 34,7 36,8 
spec. 
Total Cph.in pct. 57,3 52,5 54,9 42,7 47,5 45, 1 42,7 34,5 38,7 
Total Cph. In real 89773 78672 168445 66974 71216 138190 49826 37556 87382 
numbers 
.. 
Source:Denmarks StatIStIcal Office and Copenhagen StatIStIcal Office 
Table 6. 
Dwelling by number of rooms in housing with kitchen in pct 
January 1998 
Part of Copenhagen I room 2 rooms 3 rooms 4 rooms 5 and more Total in real numbers 
Indre By 4,5 24,3 31,0 19,8 20,5 14742 
Christianshavn 8,0 4 1,1 30,4 14,8 5,7 4703 
Indre 0sterbro 4,8 35,2 22,5 20, 1 17,3 25 185 
Y dre 0sterbro 6, 1 39, 1 31, I 16,3 7,4 20454 
Indre Norrebro 9,3 37,5 31,3 15,2 6,7 16549 
Y dre Norrebro 6,7 47,0 33,5 11 ,0 1,8 22697 
Vesterbro 3,0 40,9 29,7 17,9 8,5 19102 
Kongens Enghave 7,6 63,4 22,5 5,8 0,8 9370 
Valby 5,0 39,6 33,7 14,5 7,2 23810 
Vanlose 6,0 41,4 26,2 14,9 11 ,5 20625 
Bmnshoj-Husum 6,7 30,4 32,4 20,0 10,6 19168 
Bispebjerg 9,0 53,7 25,7 8,6 3,0 2361 1 
Sundby Nord 7,3 45,4 32,9 11 ,0 3,4 22969 
Sundby Syd 9,7 35,9 29,3 15,0 10,1 232 10 
Vestamager 4,9 62,1 22,4 8,3 2,3 4602 
Source: Denmarks Statistical Office and Copenhagen Statistical Office. 
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Table 7. 
Persons under 60 that in 1995 received temporary income-replacing benefit for at least 6 months 
31.12.1995 Temporary benefit Total 
Unemployment Sickness kontant- revalidering aktivering 
Benefit benefit hjrelp til og uddan-
fors0rgelse nelse 
-_ .... _-----_ .. _-_ .... _-----------------------Part of Copenhagen pet. ofpOpU]3(100 18 59 years --------------------- ----- ----------- -------
Indre By 6,5 1,5 4,9 1,2 3,0 12,5 
Christianshavn 10,5 2,2 10,0 2,6 5, I 22,4 
Indre Osterbro 6,7 1,5 4,7 1,2 3,2 12,5 
YdreOsterbro 7,3 1,8 5,3 1,5 3,0 13,5 
Indre N0rrebro 10,3 2,6 10,6 3,5 5,2 23,0 
Ydre N"rrebro 8,7 2,2 13,0 2,5 4,7 23,4 
Vesterbro 10,6 2,7 11,7 2,6 5,6 24,5 
Kongens Enghave 11 ,2 3,5 9,8 2,4 5,8 22,4 
Valby 7,7 2,4 7,6 2,4 3,0 16,2 
Vanl"se 6,6 1,9 4, I 1,3 2,1 11,6 
Brensh"j-Husum 7,5 2,5 8,3 2,5 3,2 16,7 
Bispebjerg 8,9 2,8 11,3 2,5 4,4 21,5 
Sundby Nord 7,9 2,4 9,9 3,5 4,1 19,4 
Sundby Syd 7,1 2,6 6,8 2,4 3,1 15,3 
Vestamager 8,7 2,3 7,1 1,9 3,5 17,4 
Copenhagen total 1995 8,1 2,3 8,4 2,3 3,8 17,9 
Copenhagen total 1994 9,1 2,2 9,9 2,2 0,8 18,3 
Source: Orientering nr. 33 1998.Copenhagen Statistical Office. 
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Appendix 3 
EU, the Oeresundsregion and the UDP. 
There is no direct linkage between the Oerestad project and EU- programmes. Indirectly the 
project is a part of the regionalisation process where Copenhagen is competing with other 
European city-regions in the "Europe of regions". The ODC and the City of Copenhagen e.g. 
in the municipal plan underlines the offensive regionalisation strategy. It is equally evident 
that beyond peripheral mentioning the project is not explicitly mentioned by politicians either 
locally or nationally in connection with the EU. 
The most recent example of this is a ambitious report published by the Danish and Swedish 
government in May, 1999 about the development of the Oeresunds region, where the 
European perspective is very much present. The report is published by the Ministry of 
Industry in Denmark but has been prepared by a large groups of experts and public 
institutions 
The Oeresundsregion has had the status as a model region in the EU since 1997, as concerns 
increase in the employment in the EU regions. This happened upon request from the Danish 
and Swedish Prime Minister. The report deals with the following issues: economy, labour 
market, environmental affairs, cultural affairs, fiscal policy (mainly in the sense of regional 
equalisation despite national differences), housing, infrastructure, education and information. 
The most important issues based on the material are the economy, the fiscal policy, the 
cultural affairs and the education, which makes sense when the desired profile of the region is 
taken into consideration. The economical and fiscal issues are the true cornerstones of the 
report since this is the foundation for the region, even though the more soft issues like the 
environment and the cultural aspect are quite strongly emphasised. The report tries to convey 
the image of a dawning region with considerable potential in all the above mentioned areas 
mainly revolving around the fact that the combination of the two cities and countries have 
both supplementary and complementary benefits from working in union. 
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The "hard issues" (economy, fiscal policy and labour market) shows that the region has good 
possibilities in the international competition for investments. It mainly deals with the proper 
parameters for a competitive business environment such as a flexible labour market with a 
high percentage of academics, and elimination of hindrances for increased exchange of goods 
and services. The fact that the region is a model region for increase in the employment in the 
EU means that this area is given special attention. The largest and most prestigious project is 
the establishment of a co-operation between the labounnarket institutions in the Copenhagen 
region and Malmoe (the city on the swedish side of Oeresund). As mentioned above it has the 
aim of creating a more flexible labour market in the spirit of the internal market with free 
exchange oflabour force across borders. 
The "soft issues" (the environment, the cultural affairs and the education) is partly a way of 
drawing a profile of the region as dynamic and hannonic and a legitimisation to show that it 
does not all boil down to economics. It arguesthat the human capital needed to fulfil the above 
mentioned requirements is present. An important activity in this regard is the establishment of 
the Oeresunds University, which is a co-operation between all institutions of higher education 
(Universities, research centres and Business Schools) that once a year holds a conference 
where the development of the Oeresund region is examined from different viewpoints 
(political, economical, cultural). The organisation dates back to 1995 and the aim is to 
strengthen the regionalisation process and to further co-operation between the participating 
institutions as concerns student exchange and research programmes. Until now the efforts has 
been rhetorical rather than practical but their activities has a clear focus and seem to progress 
towards more tangible projects. 
The rest of the issues (housing, infrastructure, information) are back-up issues to show that 
the technical requirements in the region are present or in the process of being constructed and 
that a large amount of adjusting to identical technical standards. 
The metro project is mentioned in connection with the infrastructure but the Oerestad project 
it self is not mentioned by one single word. No one from the ODC has been involved in the 
report, which means that they are the only regional project/organisation, which has not in 
some way been involved or mentioned in the report. As the Oerestad is an embodiment of the 
above issues on the Danish side this seems to indicate that the political level wants to distance 
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itself from the project, most likely due to the recent turmoil about the financial affairs and the 
delays. 
The ODe is not satisfied with this state of affairs but states that this was more the rule than 
the exception as the company was "off limits" when it came to political alliances in 
connection with regional matters despite or perhaps due to their exposure to the press in 
recent time. 
According to the ODe this tendency to avoid linkage with the company even for organisation 
which on other matters work with or sympathise with the ODe is that the ODe is seen as a 
company more than as a regional actor. Therefore it is assumed that the pursue of profits is 
above everything else for the ODe and this collides with the image of a region with emphasis 
on soft values like the environment based on "clean technology". However, it seems unlikely 
that this is the only reason for the lack of interest in the ODe on the behalf of regional actors 
and the omission of the project in the most prestigious report concerning the region until now. 
The fact that the Oerestad project has not been mentioned as a regional initiative inunderlines 
the hypothesis that it is not the project in itself that is being questioned and scrutinised by the 
public opinion but the whole process leading up to the decision making proces and subsequent 
forming of the ODe and chosing of financing system that is questioned. The project has not 
had the required legitimacy under any of the crucial phases and has not subsequently had 
success in building a strategic platform to act from. If this is the case the project will be 
paying a high price for the lack of legitimity, despite the relative success on the land sale as 
the whole arrangement is caught between large public investments to prevent it from 
becoming an economical disaster for both the city of Copenhagen and the state instead of 
marketdriven development. On the other hand the project is not being closely linked with 
public interests in general and as such the socalled4 private/public mix in the choice of 
organisation and financing structure, which should strengthen the organisation and allow for 
flexibility has instead been the biggest hindrances for success. 
4 In reality the ODC is public/public as the two partners in the company are the Municipality of Copenhagen and 
the State. The only private aspect is that the company acts as a legal entity with rules close resembling those of a 
private company. 
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As it clearly shows the regionalisation debate is concerned with issues other than UDP's as 
the Oerestad although the issues in general are related as the project is a part of the region and 
has a profile resembling that of the region. This profile is that of a region based on 
knowledgebased industry (telecommunication and medical industry) with a highly skilled 
population, that takes great care in maintaining a clean environment. 
SAMS (Scandinavian Academy of Management Studies), which is mentioned in the Danish 
literature review has written numerous papers on the potential of the region which overlaps 
with the issues mentioned in the report and is an important actor in the debate and research 
concerning the Oeresundsregion. Most of the recent papers on regional development were 
presented on a conference arranged by the Oeresund University at Alnarp in Sweden in 1998. 
They mainly deal with the economical potential of the region and more theoretical papers on 
the definition of a region in political, economical and cultural terms. So while not directly 
linked to all the areas mentioned in report, they touch upon the same areas even though they 
have not participated in the writing of the report. 
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